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I. APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT'
A. MANDAMUS AND OTHER ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS
1. Orders and Rulings Subject to Review by Mandamus
a. Discovery RulingsAS in previous Survey periods, the appellate courts continue to
L grant mandamus relief from orders compelling production of
. privileged documents. In In re University of Texas Health Center
at Tyler,2 the Texas Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering a hospital to produce documents protected from
discovery by statutory medical peer review committee privileges. Nota-
bly, the court refused to find that the trial court's disclosure of the privi-
leged documents to the hospital's opponent waived the hospital's
privilege.3
In In re City of Georgetown,4 the supreme court also granted manda-
mus relief to prohibit disclosure of, what the majority found, were confi-
dential reports of a consulting expert protected under the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure. In Georgetown, the City of Georgetown had been in-
volved in litigation regarding its wastewater treatment plants and had
hired an engineer as a consulting expert to assess certain parts of the
plants.5 Under Texas law, a consulting expert report is ordinarily privi-
leged. 6 However, an Austin newspaper, the Austin American Statesman,
filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the trial court and sought disclo-
1. The Survey period includes cases decided from October 1, 2000 to October 1, 2001.
2. 33 S.W.3d 822 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
3. Id. at 827.
4. 53 S.W.3d 328 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding).
5. Id. at 329.
6. See TEX. R. EVID. 503(a)(5), (b)(1); TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(e).
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sure of the expert's report under section 552.301(d) of the Public Infor-
mation Act, which the trial court granted.7 The supreme court held that
if, as in this case, the "documents are privileged or confidential under the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure or Texas Rules of Evidence, they are
within a 'category of information [that] is expressly made confidential
under other law' within the meaning of section 552.022 of the Public In-
formation Act."8 Accordingly, the court issued mandamus directing the
trial court to vacate its order requiring the City to produce its consulting-
expert report to the Austin American Stateman.9
Numerous appellate court decisions similarly granted mandamus relief
to avoid the production of privileged information. The Fort Worth Court
of Appeals granted mandamus to prohibit a trial court from soliciting
testimony on whether a party acted in "good faith" at a mediation, be-
cause a party's conduct at mediation is confidential under section
154.073(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.' 0 The Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief from an order requir-
ing an individual to submit to an invasive gynecological exam without any
evidence by the requesting party that there was good cause to require the
exam. 1I The Dallas Court of Appeals found that mandamus relief is ap-
propriate to correct an order staying all discovery pending resolution of a
related criminal matter where the discovery delay indefinitely deprives a
father of his right to visitation with his child.' 2
However, mandamus is not available to order production of privileged
documents under the offensive use doctrine where the trial court did not
review the privileged documents in camera prior to denying the motion to
compel.' 3 Nor is mandamus available to review monetary sanctions im-
posed against a party for refusing to respond to discovery requests de-
spite court order, because there is an adequate remedy by appeal.' 4
Moreover, although death penalty sanctions can be reviewed by manda-
mus, mandamus will not issue where there was no abuse of discretion in
imposing the sanctions.' 5
7. Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d at 329-30.
8. Id. at 337.
9. Id. In dissent, Justice Abbott, joined by Chief Justice Phillips and Justice Baker,
disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Section 552.022 of the Texas Government
Code, concluding that the Legislature does not consider the rules of civil procedure and
the rules of evidence as "other laws." Id. at 339 (Abbott, J., dissenting).
10. In re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 443, 452-53 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000,
orig. proceeding).
11. In re Caballero, 36 S.W.3d 143, 145 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, orig.
proceeding).
12. In re R.R., 26 S.W.3d 569, 573 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, orig. proceeding).
13. In re United Supermarkets, Inc., 36 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000,
orig. proceeding).
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b. Order Overruling Objections to Visiting Judge
The appellate courts consistently grant mandamus relief where an as-
signed judge refuses to recuse himself or herself after a party has filed a
timely objection under Chapter 74 of the Texas Government Code. In
this Survey period, the supreme court granted mandamus relief to correct
a judgment by the court of appeals ordering an assigned judge to recuse
himself where the objection to the judge was not timely made. 16 In In re
Canales, an assigned judge presided over several discovery hearings with-
out objection.17 Several months later a party objected to the assignment
of the same judge to preside over the underlying case.' 8 The supreme
court concluded that, to be timely, a party must object to the assigned
judge's appointment before the judge "preside[s] over any pretrial hear-
ings in the case."'19
However, mandamus will not issue where a party attempts to assert a
Chapter 74 objection to a presiding judge of the administrative region
hearing a recusal motion, because Chapter 74 does not permit such an
objection.20
c. Void Orders
In this Survey period, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals granted manda-
mus relief from void orders on several occasions. In In re Boyd,21 the
court granted petitions for writs of mandamus and of prohibition holding
that a trial court's orders for temporary relief signed more than thirty
days after an appeal was perfected from a divorce decree were void. 22
In In re Acceptance Ins. Co.,23 the court found that the trial court
abused its discretion and violated the relator's due process rights by
scheduling a sanctions hearing without giving written notice of the hear-
ing or its subject matter.24 Accordingly, the court granted the writ of
mandamus and ordered that the hearing was void.25
The court also granted mandamus relief from an order by the original
trial court transferring a case back to that court after it had been reas-
signed to a new judge. 26 Under Chapter 74 of the Texas Government
Code, once a case is assigned to a new judge, the original trial court has
no authority to transfer the case back to his court, and any such order is
16. In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 704 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding).
17. Id. at 700.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 704.
20. See In re Flores, 53 S.W.3d 428, 431-32 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, orig.
proceeding).
21. 34 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding).
22. Id. at 711.
23. 33 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding).
24. Id. at 451.
25. Id. at 454.




void, justifying mandamus relief.27
d. Incidental Rulings
Mandamus is generally not available to correct incidental rulings by the
trial court, including rulings on pleas to the jurisdiction, 28 venue, 29 or mo-
tions for continuances. 30 However, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held
in In re North American Refractories Co.31 that mandamus relief is availa-
ble to correct a trial court's order denying a motion for continuance of a
trial setting where a mandatory local rule required the court to honor
vacation letters and defendants were given only two weeks notice of the
first trial setting in violation of both due process and local rules requiring
forty-five (45) days notice of the first trial setting.32
e. Acts of Special Commissioner
Mandamus will not issue to order a Special Commissioner, appointed
in a condemnation proceeding, to take certain actions, because the "Gov-
ernment Code does not confer mandamus jurisdiction over [such]
commissioners. ,33
f. Order Disqualifying Counsel
Mandamus will issue to correct an order improperly disqualifying coun-
sel. In In re Chonody,34 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals found that the
trial court abused its discretion by granting a motion to disqualify counsel
without evidence to support the disqualification. 35 Notably, the court did
not foreclose the possibility of disqualification of a lawyer who had previ-
ously represented the husband in a criminal case involving domestic vio-
lence and now represented the wife in a divorce proceeding, but granted
mandamus relief because the issue was decided without any evidence to
support the disqualification. 36
27. Id. at 462-63.
28. See Denton County v. Huther, 43 S.W.3d 665, 667 n.2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2001, no pet.); In re Aramark Corp., 38 S.W.3d 291, 293 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, orig.
proceeding).
29. See In re City of Irving, 45 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, orig.
proceeding); In re Colonial Cas. Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 399, 400 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000,
orig. proceeding).
30. See General Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 477 (Tex. 1997) (orig.
proceeding).
31. No. 09-01-270-CV, 2001 WL 1517920 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Nov. 29, 2001, orig.
proceeding).
32. Id. at *3.
33. In re McAfee, 54 S.W.3d 460, 461 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, orig. proceeding) (per
curiam).
34. 49 S.W.3d 376 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding).
35. Id. at 380.
36. Id.
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g. Orders Denying Motions to Compel Arbitration
As in previous Survey periods, courts consistently grant mandamus re-
lief to a party that is "improperly denied the right to arbitration under an
agreement subject to the Federal Arbitration Act." 37
2. Mandamus Procedures
To be entitled to mandamus relief, a party must comply with the techni-
cal requirements of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. A stubborn
refusal to abide by these Rules can result not just in dismissal of the peti-
tion, but in denial of the requested relief. In In re Hensler,38 the Waco
Court of Appeals denied a petition for writ of mandamus after the Rela-
tor failed to file proof of service during a seven month period, despite two
separate requests from the court for proof of service. 39
B. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
1. Review of Interlocutory Appeals By the Texas Supreme Court
The Texas Supreme Court recently construed Texas Government Code
Section 22.225 as stating that a judgment by the court of appeals in an
interlocutory appeal that is allowed by law is conclusive on the facts and
review by the supreme court is not allowed, except in cases where (1)
"there was a dissent in the court of appeals," or (2) "the court of appeals'
holding conflicts with that of another court of appeals or this Court. '40
Traditionally, the supreme court has narrowly construed Section 22.225,
exercising conflicts jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal only three
times within the last decade.4' In a dissenting opinion in a case where the
court had dismissed the petition from an interlocutory appeal for want of
jurisdiction, Justice Hecht complained that
[o]ur unshaken view of what we have come to call "conflicts jurisdic-
tion" . . . has been hypertechnically narrow, motivated by a jurisdic-
tion-avoidance determination that has no regard for the obvious,
prudential, and entirely salutary purpose of the power granted by the
Legislature, which is to resolve important legal disputes among the
courts of appeals so that Texas law is not one thing for litigants in
one of fourteen court of appeals districts and a different thing for
37. In re Winter Park Constr., Inc., 30 S.W.3d 576, 579 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000,
orig. proceeding). But see GAF Corp. v. Bamber, 29 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
2000, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus relief because claims alleged were not subject
to arbitration clause).
38. 27 S.W.3d 719 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
39. Id. at 720.
40. Bland I.S.D. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tex. 2000); TEX. GOV'Tr CODE ANN.
§ 22.225(b)(3), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
41. Justice Hecht, adopting the petitioner's briefing, noted that the court's "exercise of
conflicts jurisdiction is thus more rare than a blue moon (5 in the last 10 years), a total
eclipse of the sun (6 in the past decade), or the birth of a Giant Panda in captivity (18 in
1999 alone, 15 of which survived)." Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 53 S.W.3d 347,
350 (Tex. 2001) (Hecht, J., dissenting).
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litigants in other districts.42
In the wake of this criticism, the court found jurisdiction over interloc-
utory appeals in several cases during this Survey period-finding jurisdic-
tion over an interlocutory appeal where there was a dissent as to part, but
not all, of the appellate court's decision and finding conflicts jurisdiction
twice. 43 The court also noted that it has jurisdiction to review an appel-
late court's decision that it lacks jurisdiction over an interlocutory
appeal.44
a. Jurisdiction Based on a Dissent in the Court of Appeals
By statute, the supreme court has jurisdiction over an interlocutory ap-
peal where the "justices of the courts of appeals disagree on a question of
law material to the decision. '45 In Brown v. Todd,46 the supreme court
faced the question of whether the dissenting opinion must be on the same
issue raised in the supreme court. In Brown, the trial court found that
one of two plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the City of Houston and its
Mayor over an executive order of the Mayor. 47 However, the court did
enjoin the City from enforcing the executive order. 48 The plaintiff ap-
pealed the trial court's order dismissing his claim, and the City appealed
from the temporary injunction.49 The court of appeals affirmed the in-
junction and the finding of no standing against one of the plaintiffs
(Hotze), but there was a dissenting opinion on the standing issue.50
Both Hotze and the City filed petitions for review with the supreme
court - Hotze challenging the finding that he lacked standing and the City
challenging the injunction.5 1 The City asserted jurisdiction on the
grounds that the issues were important to the jurisprudence of the State,
which the court noted did not satisfy the limited jurisdictional provisions
of the Government Code regarding interlocutory appeals. 52 Hotze, how-
ever, asserted that the court had jurisdiction over his appeal as a result of
the dissenting opinion. 53 While the court acknowledged that it would not
have jurisdiction over the City's petition by itself, the court reasoned that
because it had jurisdiction to hear Hotze's appeal, it "acquire[d] jurisdic-
tion of the entire case." 54
42. Id. at 349.
43. See Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. 2001); Texas Natural Res. Conservation
Comm'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2001); Bland ISD v. Blue, 37 S.W.3d 547 (Tex.
2000).
44. McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2001).
45. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(c) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
46. 53 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. 2001).




51. Brown, 53 S.W.3d at 300.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 301 (quoting Harry Eldridge Co. v. T.S. Lankford & Sons, Inc., 371 S.W.2d
878, 879 (Tex. 1963)).
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b. Conflicts Jurisdiction
In several cases during this Survey period, the supreme court found
conflicts jurisdiction. In Bland Independent School District v. Blue,55 the
court defined when a holding conflicts with another court of appeals for
purposes of determining jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals. In that
case, the Bland Independent School District filed a plea to the jurisdic-
tion, claiming that two individuals challenging how the school district had
financed a construction project lacked standing to sue.56 The trial court
overruled BISD's jurisdictional challenge based solely on the plaintiffs'
pleadings without reference to the actual evidence presented by BISD.57
BISD filed an interlocutory appeal asserting error in the trial court's
failure to consider BISD's evidence. The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's ruling, concluding that the trial court could not look beyond
the plaintiffs' pleadings to determine jurisdiction. 58
BISD filed a petition for review with the supreme court. Prior to ad-
dressing the merits of BISD's appeal, the court considered its own juris-
diction to review an interlocutory appeal. 59 The court noted that to have
conflicts jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal, "'[t]he conflict must be
on the very questions of law actually involved and determined, in respect
of an issue in both cases, the test being whether one would operate to
overrule the other in case they were both rendered by the same court." 60
The conflict between the cases must "appear on the face of the opinions
themselves. '"61
The court rejected cases that simply implied that evidence could be
considered or even cases that may have actually considered evidence in
deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, because none of the authorities held on
their face that evidence must be considered. 62 However, the court noted
one case where it had remanded a plea to the jurisdiction to "determine
whether the evidence was factually sufficient to support the trial court's
ruling."'63 Although the case did not expressly discuss "whether evidence
could be considered in deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, the propriety of
such evidence was essential to our ruling on the face of the opinion. Our
judgment would have been different if consideration of such evidence
had been improper. '64 The court reasoned that "[i]f a rule of decision in
one case would require a different result were it applied in another case,
the conflict between the two cases is sufficient to invoke our jurisdiction
55. 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000).
56. Id. at 550.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 551.
59. Id.
60. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 551 (quoting Christy v. Williams, 156 Tex. 555, 560, 298 S.W.2d
565, 568-69 (1957)).
61. Id. (quoting State v. Wynn, 157 Tex. 200, 203, 301 S.W.2d 76, 79 (1957)).
62. Id. at 551-52.




over an interlocutory appeal. '65
The dissent, filed by Chief Justice Phillips and joined by Justices Enoch
and Hankinson, agreed with the standards applied by the majority but
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the rule espoused in the ear-
lier decision would require a different result in this case. 66 Chief Justice
Phillips warned against result-oriented opinions and noted "I realize that
it is difficult to resist 'the desire to remedy significant errors' arising in
interlocutory appeals [citation omitted] ... But as a Court of limited ap-
pellate jurisdiction, we must wait until issues are properly before us
before we address them by judicial decision. '67
The court also found conflicts jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal
in Texas Natural Resource Conservation Comm'n v. White.68 In White,
the plaintiff sued the TNRCC after a fire destroyed her business. 69 The
TNRCC filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming sovereign immunity
under the Texas Tort Claims Act. 70 Under Section 101.021 of the Texas
Tort Claims Act, the TNRCC was not immune from suit if the stationary
electric motor-driven pump at issue in the lawsuit was "motor-driven
equipment" as defined in the Act.71 The trial court and the court of ap-
peals on interlocutory appeal both found that the plaintiff sufficiently al-
leged that the TNRCC's pump was "motor-driven equipment" within the
Act and that the TNRCC was not immune from liability. 72
The TNRCC sought review in the supreme court asserting that the
court of appeals' opinion conflicted with an opinion from the San
Antonio Court of Appeals that found two grounds to support the plea to
the jurisdiction, one of which was the conclusion that the pump in ques-
tion was not "motor-driven equipment. '73 The court concluded that be-
cause of "the factual similarities between [the San Antonio court of
appeals opinion] and this case, and the divergence between the two cases'
holdings, we conclude that one decision 'would operate to overrule the
other." 74 Accordingly, the court found jurisdiction to review the merits
of the case.
In contrast, the court found no conflicts jurisdiction in Resendez v.
Johnson.75 In Resendez, the parents of four students sued the Dallas In-
dependent School District, the school superintendent, the school princi-
pal and two teachers for excessive punishment.76 The school district was
65. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 553.
66. Id. at 559 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. 46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2001).
69. Id. at 866.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 866-67.
73. White, 46 S.W.3d at 867-68.
74. Id. at 868.
75. 52 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. 2001).
76. Id. at 690.
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granted summary judgment. 77 The other defendants then filed a plea to
the jurisdiction claiming that they were immune from suit under section
101.106 of the Texas Tort Claims Act, because the district had already
been dismissed on summary judgment.7 8 The trial court denied the plea,
and the court of appeals affirmed holding that section 101.106 of the
Texas Tort Claims Act does not confer immunity without a final judgment
for the school district.7 9 In a prior opinion, the supreme court had con-
cluded "section 101.106 applies if a judgment is rendered against the gov-
ernmental unit at any time during the pendency of the action against the
employee. '80 The court noted that it did not decide in its prior decision
the exact question at issue in this case-whether an interlocutory judg-
ment would bar an action pursuant to section 101.106.81 Accordingly, the
court found that it lacked conflicts jurisdiction over the appeal.
2. Appealing an Order Allowing or Denying Intervention or Joinder
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court took the opportu-
nity to clarify the scope of Section 15.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and




80. Resendez, 52 S.W.3d at 691 (analyzing Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352 (Tex.
1995)).
81. Id.
82. American Home Prods. Corp. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. 2000). Section 15.003
of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code provides:
(a) In a suit where more than one plaintiff is joined each plaintiff must, inde-
pendently of any other plaintiff, establish proper venue. Any person who is
unable to establish proper venue may not join or maintain venue for the'suit
as a plaintiff unless the person, independently of any other plaintiff, estab-
lishes that:
(1) joinder or intervention in the suit is proper under the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure;
(2) maintaining venue in the county of suit does not unfairly prejudice
another party to the suit;
(3) there is an essential need to have the person's claim tried in the
county in which the suit is pending; and
(4) the county in which the suit is pending is a fair and convenient venue
for the person seeking to join in or maintain venue for the suit and the
persons against whom the suit is brought.
(b) A person may not intervene or join in a pending suit as a plaintiff unless
the person, independently of any other plaintiff:
(1) establishes proper venue for the county in which the suit is pending;
or
(2) satisfies the requirements of Subdivisions (1) through (4) of Subsec-
tion (a).
(c) Any person seeking intervention or joinder, who is unable to indepen-
dently establish proper venue, or a party opposing intervention or joinder of
such a person may contest the decision of the trial court allowing or denying
intervention or joinder by taking an interlocutory appeal to the court of ap-
peals district in which the trial court is located under the procedures estab-
lished for interlocutory appeals. The appeal must be perfected not later than
the 20th day after the date the trial court signs the order denying or allowing
the intervention or joinder. The court of appeals shall:
2002]
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Section 15.003(a) provides that, in a suit in which more than one plain-
tiff is joined, each plaintiff must independently establish proper venue. 83
While there is no right to an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's de-
termination of a venue question, 84 the Legislature has provided the right
of limited interlocutory appeal in an intervention or joinder situation:
Any person seeking intervention or joinder, who is unable to inde-
pendently establish proper venue, or a party opposing intervention
or joinder of such a person may contest the decision of the trial court
allowing or denying intervention or joinder by taking an interlocu-
tory appeal to the court of appeals district in which the trial court is
located under the procedures established for interlocutory appeals. 85
According to the supreme court in American Home, this statute "al-
lows an interlocutory appeal for one specific purpose: to contest the trial
court's decision allowing or denying intervention or joinder. '86 The stat-
ute does not provide for an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's
conclusion that a person seeking intervention or joinder has indepen-
dently established proper venue. 87 Only when the trial court's order nec-
essarily determines an intervention or joinder issue under section
15.003(a), which takes as its starting point a "person who is unable to
establish proper venue," does section 15.003(c) allow for either party to
contest that decision by taking an interlocutory appeal.8 8 If the trial court
determines that venue is proper under section 15.002, the inquiry is over,
and no interlocutory appeal is available even if the trial court's venue
decision is erroneous.89 The Court in American Home accordingly re-
jected the petitioner's argument that a court of appeals has interlocutory-
appeal jurisdiction over all venue decisions that relate to intervention or
joinder under section 15.003, reasoning that such an interpretation would
make "any trial court venue decision under § 15.002 in a multi-plaintiff
case reviewable by interlocutory appeal, which is contrary to the plain
language of [section 15.064]."90
(1) determine whether the joinder or intervention is proper based on an
independent determination from the record and not under either an
abuse of discretion or substantial evidence standard; and
(2) render its decision not later than the 120th day after the date the
appeal is perfected by the complaining party.
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
83. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CoE ANN. § 15.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
84. Id. § 15.064(a).
85. Id. § 15.003(c).




90. Id. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064 (Vernon Supp. 2001) ("No
interlocutory appeal shall lie from the [venue] determination.").
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3. Appealing an Order Certifying or Refusing to Certify a Class Action
a. Order Altering the Fundamental Nature of the Class
Section 51.014(a)(3) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
gives a party the statutory right to appeal an interlocutory order that cer-
tifies or refuses to certify a class action.91 As the construction of this
statute has developed, an order may be subject to interlocutory appeal
even if it does not expressly certify or refuse to certify a class. For exam-
ple, in 1996, the Texas Supreme Court held in De Los Santos v. Occiden-
tal Chemical Corp.92 that an interlocutory order changing a certified class
from opt-out to mandatory was appealable under section 51.014(a)(3),
because such an order "alters the fundamental nature of the class."' 93 In
contrast, an order changing the size of a class merely modifies a certifica-
tion order and does not qualify as an "order certifying or refusing to cer-
tify a class."'94
What about an interlocutory partial summary judgment on liability en-
tered in favor of the plaintiffs after an opt-out class is certified but before
notice is sent to the class? Arguably, the summary judgment makes it less
likely that class members will opt out. The supreme court faced this issue
in Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson,95 when the defendant attempted
an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order refusing to decertify the
class after it had entered a partial summary judgment on liability against
the defendant preceding notice of the lawsuit to the class members. 96 The
defendant argued that the fundamental nature of the class was altered by
the trial court's rulings, because the pre-notice partial summary judgment
virtually eliminated the potential class members' incentives to opt out,
effectively transforming the opt-out nature of the class into a de facto
mandatory class. 97
Rejecting this argument, the supreme court held that, even if the trial
court's partial summary judgment created an incentive to stay in the class,
this would affect only the size of the class, not its fundamental nature. 98
De Los Santos, the Court explained, was not about strategic opting in,
which was the defendant's complaint in Bally, but "about forcing plain-
tiffs who had already opted out into a mandatory settlement class." 99 In
contrast to the class members in De Los Santos, the Bally class members
faced no legal bar to opting out as a result of the pre-notice partial sum-
mary judgment, nor were they forced into the class against their will.100
91. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(3) (Vernon 2001).
92. 933 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1996).
93. Id. at 495.
94. Id. (citing Pierce Mortuary Colleges, Inc. v. Bjerke, 841 S.W.2d 878, 880-81 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied)).
95. 53 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. 2001).
96. Id. at 353.
97. Id. at 355.
98. Id. at 356.
99. Id.
100. Bally, 53 S.W.3d at 356.
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Because the trial court's order "changed nothing about the class itself," it
was not subject to interlocutory appeal, even if the order was wrong. 10'
b. "Preliminary" Order Certifying a Class
In McAllen Medical Center, Inc. v. Cortez, the supreme court analyzed
whether a "preliminary" certification order permitting the plaintiffs and
their counsel to proceed as a class, without first determining that the re-
quirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 have been met is ripe for
appellate review.' 0 2 The case before the court after the court of appeals
dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 0 3 Shortly af-
ter suit was filed, the trial court in McAllen certified a class action "for
purposes of settlement with [one of the defendants] only" and deferred
its inquiry under Rule 42's numerosity, commonality, typicality, and ade-
quacy criteria to the fairness hearing on the settlement.' 0 4 On interlocu-
tory appeal from the class certification order, the appellee argued that,
because the trial court had made no final determination as to Rule 42's
criteria, appellate review of the trial court's certification order was pre-
mature. 105 The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as "premature."' 10 6
Noting that trial courts are required to perform a "rigorous analysis"
before ruling on class certification to determine whether all prerequisites
to certification have been met, the supreme court concluded that the cer-
tification order was ripe for appellate review and could "not be shielded
from appellate review merely because it [was] termed 'preliminary' or
because the trial court [might] later reconsider its ruling at a fairness
hearing."10 7
4. Appealing an Order Granting or Denying a Temporary Injunction
An interlocutory order granting or refusing to grant a temporary in-
101. Id. ("That the order might be wrong (which we do not decide) does not make it
appealable, else all alleged irregularities in a class-action suit would be immediately subject
to review."). Justice Owen, joined by Justices Hecht and Abbott, dissented, finding that
the trial court's refusal to decertify the class after entry of a pre-notice partial summaryjudgment against the defendant altered the fundamental nature of the class "because under
our class action rule, when liability is resolved before notice is given to class members, the
class certification can no longer be sustained, and the class must be decertified." Id. at 359(Owen, J., dissenting). The crux of the disagreement between the majority and the dissent
was the issue of whether any pre-notice merits determination favoring the plaintiff requires
decertification. The dissent argued that it does, resulting in a fundamental change in the
nature of the class (mandatory decertification), while the majority questioned the authority
relied upon by the dissent for this proposition and concluded that, in any event, the order,
even if wrong, changed nothing about the class itself. Id. at 356-57, 359.
102. 66 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2001).
103. Id. at 231. The supreme court granted review of the case to consider whether the




107. McAllen, 66 S.W.3d at 232-33 ("Once the trial court certified the settlement class
against [the defendant], its order was ripe for appellate review, and the court of appeals
erred in dismissing [appellant's] appeal as 'premature."').
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junction is appealable. 10 8 Of course, to be appealable, the order must
constitute a "temporary injunction." An order requiring the deposit of
funds into the registry of a court cannot be characterized as an appealable
temporary injunction, even if entered in response to a motion for injunc-
tive relief.10 9
5. Appealing an Order Assessing Sanctions
A trial court's order assessing monetary sanctions against an attorney
in a case is not an appealable interlocutory order, because there is no
statutory authority for such an appeal.1 10 Any appeal of such sanctions is
necessarily taken from the date of the final judgment."1 Notably, while
an attorney against whom sanctions have been assessed is not a party to
the lawsuit and thus would not ordinarily have the authority to file an
appeal from that judgment, the order awarding the sanction is nonethe-
less reviewable on appeal from the final judgment.112 Not only may the
non-party attorney appeal from the final judgment to challenge the sanc-
tions order, he may do so in a separate appeal."13
6. Appealing an Order That Grants a Bill of Review but Does Not
Dispose of the Underlying Lawsuit
During the Survey period, the Houston Court of Appeals, in Mills v.
Corvettes of Houston, Inc.,114 confirmed that the rule in Texas concerning
bills of review is well-established: "An order which grants a bill of review
and voids a judgment in an underlying lawsuit, but which does not dis-
pose of the underlying lawsuit, is not a final appealable order." 115 An
order granting a bill of review is not among the enumerated items of sec-
tion 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which is a
narrow exception to the general rule that only final judgments and orders
are appealable." 16
108. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
109. Faddoul, Glasheen & Valles, P.C. v. Oaxaca, 52 S.W.3d 209, 212 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 2001, no pet.).
110. See Onstad v. Wright, 54 S.W.3d 799, 803 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. filed).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 804 ("Indeed, if no appeal had been taken by a party, it is clear that [the
attorney] would have been required to file a separate appeal in order to contest the order
awarding the sanction. We are not convinced that this situation is materially changed by
the plaintiffs' decision to pursue an appeal. In this situation, we find it permissible for [the
attorney] to appeal from the sanction in a separate appeal.").
114. 44 S.W.3d 197, 199 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (citing Jordan
v. Jordan, 907 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1995)).
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Lehman v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Tex. 2001). See TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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7. Consideration of Non-appealable Orders That Affect the Validity of
an Appealable Interlocutory Order
At least one court of appeals has held that, to the extent the subject
matter of a non-appealable interlocutory order may affect the validity of
an appealable interlocutory order, the non-appealable order may be con-
sidered on interlocutory appeal. 117 While not rejecting this concept out-
right, the El Paso Court of Appeals in Faddoul, Glasheen & Valles, P.C. v.
Oaxaca118 nonetheless denied the appellants' request that the court re-
view the trial court's non-appealable order denying their motion to abate
on the grounds that it affected the validity of an appealable order grant-
ing temporary injunctive relief.119
8. Orders Subject to Interlocutory Appeal
A trial court's order denying a motion that is substantively a motion for
new trial or for reconsideration of an appealable interlocutory order is
not of itself subject to interlocutory appeal.120 As recently held by the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Denton County v. Huther, this would
include an order denying a motion that renews the original motion and
requests the trial court to reconsider the prior order, even if the renewed
motion or motion for reconsideration is based upon new authority. 12 1
The fact that the renewed motion cites additional authority in support of
the original motion, which was not originally included when the motion
was first presented to the trial court, does not "transform the motion into
a second, separate and distinct [request]."'1 22 Accordingly, under such
circumstances, an order denying a renewed motion or motion for recon-
sideration is not an appealable interlocutory order.123 The Huther court
suggested that there had to be a substantive difference between the re-
newed motion and a typical motion for new trial or motion for reconsid-
eration before an order denying the renewed motion would constitute a
distinct order subject to interlocutory appeal. 124
9. Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal
Under section 51.014(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(a) has "the effect of
staying the commencement of a trial in the trial court pending the resolu-
tion of the appeal." 125 At least one court of appeals has limited the scope
117. See Letson v. Barnes, 979 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, pet.
denied).
118. 52 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.).
119. Id. at 211-12.
120. TEX. R. App. P. 28.1; Denton County v. Huther, 43 S.W.3d 665, 666 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).




125. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(b) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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of this statutory-mandated stay to a stay of only those parts of the trial
proceeding that may be affected by the court of appeals' decision in the
interlocutory appeal.126
Applying this precedent during the Survey period, the San Antonio
Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's refusal to stay commencement
of trial in Sheinfeld, Maley & Kay, PC. v. Bellush,127 concluding that the
court of appeals' decision in the interlocutory appeal would necessarily
affect each of the claims pending in the case. 128 Notably, the court of
appeals was not swayed by the fact that the trial court had severed the
pending claims into a different cause, rejecting the argument that none of
the pending claims would be affected by the interlocutory appeal because
they had been severed into the separate cause. 129 The court held that the
severance argument "ignores the realities of the [interlocutory] order. If
the interlocutory appeal affected the pending claims at the time the trial
court denied the motion to stay, the trial court erred in denying the mo-
tion regardless of its subsequent severance of those claims.' 130 "The sev-
erance," the court concluded, "cannot isolate the claims that would be
affected by the [interlocutory order] or the intent of the legislature could
be circumvented in every case in which an interlocutory appeal is pending
by simply severing the order on appeal from the remainder of the
cause."
131
II. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
During the Survey period, the supreme court confirmed several well-
established principles involving the preservation of error at the trial stage.
For example, the court held in Harris County Bail Bond Board v. Black-
wood that a post-judgment motion arguing that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the judgment adequately preserves the error, be-
cause a no-evidence challenge may be raised for the first time in a post-
judgment motion.' 32 The court similarly reiterated in both Texas Natural
Resource Conservation Commission v. White133 and Coastal Liquids
Transportation, L.P. v. Harris County Appraisal District134 the basic rule
that arguments not made to the trial court generally cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. 35
126. See Tarrant Regional Water Dist. v. Gragg, 962 S.W.2d 717,719 (Tex. App.-Waco
1998, no pet.).
127. 61 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).




132. 41 S.W.3d 123, 127 (Tex. 2001).
133. 46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2001).
134. 46 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. 2001).
135. White, 46 S.W.3d at 870 (citing Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. 1998));




As for preservation cases from the courts of appeals during the Survey
period, of note is the Waco Court of Appeals' opinion in Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Reece 136 analyzing the concept of implied rulings under Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a)(2)(A). In Reece, the appellant com-
plained on appeal of improper side-bar remarks made by opposing coun-
sel in front of the jury, which violated the parties' pretrial motions in
limine.137 At trial, the appellant objected to the side-bar remarks on the
basis of the motions in limine, and the court responded by asking the
parties to abide by those motions. 38 While the Waco court in Reece
noted that inappropriate side-bar remarks are to be "rigidly repressed"
under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 the court said, "this does not
excuse counsel from complying with the basic rules for preservation of
error." 140 The Waco court concluded that, even applying the implied rul-
ing provisions of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the trial court's
response was too indefinite to constitute even an implicit ruling on the
objection, and any error was waived. 141
The Houston Court of Appeals similarly found waiver in Jones v.
Lurie142 when the appellant failed to make a bill of exceptions or other
offer of proof showing the substance of excluded evidence.143 The court
of appeals confirmed that "[e]rror may not be based on a ruling that ex-
cludes evidence unless the substance of the evidence was made known to
the [trial] court by offer of proof."' 144 In contrast, no waiver occurred in
Texas A & M University v. Chambers 45 when the appellant objected to
the trial court's improper inclusion of a presumption in the jury charge by
stating that the charge improperly shifted the burden of proof to the de-
fendant because the presumption should have dropped out of the case. 146
The Austin Court of Appeals held that this objection was specific enough
to preserve the complaint for appellate review. 147 While "[i]ncluding a
presumption in the jury charge which has been rebutted by controverting
facts is an improper comment on the weight of the evidence," the court of
appeals cautioned that "[i]t is insufficient to object to a jury charge by
stating only that the instruction constitutes a comment on the weight of
the evidence."' 148
136. 32 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. granted).
137. Id. at 346-77.
138. Id. at 348.
139. TEX. R. Cv. P. 269(f).
140. Reece, 32 S.W.3d at 347.
141. Id. at 348. See TEX. R. A, ,. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A).
142. 32 S.W.3d 737 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
143. Id. at 745.
144. Id. See TEX. R. Evio. 103(a)(2).
145. 31 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied).
146. Id. at 783 n.1.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 783 n.1, 785.
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III. JUDGMENTS
A. FINALITY IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT CONTEXT
At the beginning of the Survey period, the courts of appeals continued
to struggle 149 to determine when a judgment rendered without a conven-
tional trial on the merits is final for purposes of appeal in light of the
supreme court's decision in Mafrige v. Ross 150 "that a summary judgment
that on its face purported to dispose of all issues and all parties was final
for purposes of appeal."' 151 Under Mafrige, a "judgment containing lan-
guage purporting to grant or deny relief that disposes of all claims or
parties [like a Mother Hubbard clause], regardless of the intent of the
parties or the trial court," resulted in a judgment that was final as to all
issues and all parties. 152 During the Survey period, the supreme court
issued Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.,153 which effectively overturned the
Mafrige rule, holding:
We no longer believe that a Mother Hubbard clause in an order or in
a judgment issued without full trial can be taken to indicate finality.
We therefore hold that in cases in which only one final and appeala-
ble judgment can be rendered, a judgment issued without a conven-
tional trial is final for purposes of appeal if and only if either it
actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, re-
gardless of its language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is
a final judgment as to all claims and all parties. 54
Applying its ruling in Lehmann, the supreme court in Guajardo v. Con-
well' 5 5 held that the trial court's summary judgment order was not final
and appealable where it included a Mother Hubbard clause but did not
specifically mention claims not addressed by the motions for summary
judgment. The court emphasized that "a judgment is final for purposes of
appeal in circumstances like those of this case 'if and only if either it
actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, or it
states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment."1156 Mother
Hubbard language, the Court reiterated, "does not indicate finality.' 5 7
Where, as in Guajardo, there is no language other than the Mother Hub-
bard clause to indicate finality and the order does not actually dispose of
all claims and parties by specifically mentioning those claims not ad-
dressed by the motions for summary judgment, the order is not final and
149. See Stettner Clinic, Inc. v. Burns, 61 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no
pet.) (holding that trial court order granting partial summary judgment was not final and
appealable despite inclusion of Mother Hubbard language since the order also included a
statement expressly reserving the issue of damages for later resolution).
150. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
151. Henderson v. Duran, 39 S.W.3d 392, 394 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
152. Harris County v. Nash, 22 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000),
rev'd, 63 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. 2001).
153. 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001).
154. Id. at 192.
155. 46 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. 2001).
156. Id. at 863-64 (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192).




The supreme court similarly concluded that neither of the summary
judgment orders entered in Clark v. Pimienta159 or Bobbitt v. Stran'60
were final and appealable despite the inclusion of Mother Hubbard lan-
guage, where both orders were interlocutory on their faces (they were
both entitled "partial summary judgment") and neither disposed of all
claims and parties in the case. 161
The supreme court also applied Lehmann during the Survey period in
the context of a motion for summary judgment that encompassed all
claims in the case followed by an order containing Mother Hubbard lan-
guage. In Parking Company of America v. Wilson, 162 the plaintiff moved
for summary judgment on all of its claims against the defendant (breach
of contract, accounting, damages, attorney's fees). 163 The trial court
granted summary judgment in an order that: (i) was titled "Partial Sum-
mary Judgment," (ii) contained language that the motion was "granted in
part and denied in part," and (iii) expressly found liability and awarded
damages based on the plaintiff's claim for breach of contract. 164 The or-
der did not expressly mention the plaintiff's accounting action or his
claim for attorney's fees but contained a Mother Hubbard clause stating
that "all other relief requested is hereby denied."' 65 Thereafter, the
plaintiff nonsuited his accounting action and the issue of attorney's fees
was tried to the bench. Ultimately the trial court entered a "Final Judg-
ment" that incorporated the partial summary judgment and awarded at-
torney's fees. 166 When the defendants appealed from this judgment, the
court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding
that the summary judgment order was made final by the inclusion of the
Mother Hubbard language and that no appeal from that order was timely
perfected. 67 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals, holding
that, under Lehmann, the summary judgment was "clearly interlocutory"
158. Id.
159. 47 S.W.3d 485 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
160. 52 S.W.3d 734 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
161. In Bobbitt, claims by the plaintiffs against some or all of the defendants, counter-
claims by three defendants against one of the plaintiffs, and a cross-claim all appeared to
have remained pending at the time the summary judgment order containing the Mother
Hubbard language was entered. 52 S.W.3d at 735. In Clark, the plaintiff sued three groups
of defendants on various claims and the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
one of the groups of defendants. 47 S.W.3d at 486. Later, in the order at issue on appeal,
the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of a second group of defendants and
included a Mother Hubbard clause in the order despite the fact that the third group of
defendants had not moved for summary judgment. Id. The supreme court concluded that
the trial court's second order granting summary judgment was not final and appealable,
regardless of the inclusion of Mother Hubbard language, because it "did not expressly
dispose of all the claims and parties in the case, nor was its intent to do so unmistakeable."
Id.





167. Wilson, 58 S.W.3d at 742.
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despite the presence of the Mother Hubbard clause and the appeal from
the final judgment was, therefore, timely perfected. 168
So far, the courts of appeals have for the most part applied Lehmann
without difficulty or significant explanation. 169 Of interest, however, are
two cases decided by the Fourteenth Court of Appeals. First, the court
made some noteworthy observations in Taub v. Dedman170 regarding the
process of determining finality under Lehmann. In Taub, the Fourteenth
Court of Appeals held that, in light of the state of the record reflecting
unresolved claims and parties, and the absence of any language indicating
an intention of finality other than the Mother Hubbard clause, the trial
court's summary judgment order was interlocutory and not appealable. 171
In reaching its holding, the court noted that in determining finality under
Lehmann, it may be necessary to examine the language of the summary
judgment order in light of the record as a whole.172
However, the balance still appears to be in favor of finality. A judg-
ment that finally disposes of all remaining parties and claims is final
regardless of its language, yet unequivocal language expressing final-
ity controls to make an order final even if the record indicates that
such judgment is erroneous.7 3
The Taub court concluded that, under Lehmann, a Mother Hubbard
clause in an order on an interlocutory motion may only mean that any
relief requested in the motion but not specifically granted in the order is
denied, or it may have no intended meaning at all, being inserted simply
168. Id.
169. See Lucas v. Burleson Publ'g Co., 39 S.W.3d 693, 695-96 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001,
no pet.) (determining from review of the record reflecting unresolved parties and claims
and from review of trial court's order entitled "partial" summary judgment that the trial
court had not intended to dispose of all parties and claims, despite presence of Mother
Hubbard language in summary judgment order and stating that where the judgment is
interlocutory, "inclusion of the Mother Hubbard clause cannot make it final."); Henderson
v. Duran, 39 S.W.3d 392, 394 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.) (concluding that, on the
record before the court of appeals, the trial court had not intended the judgment to dispose
of all four of the plaintiff's claims where only two were addressed in his motion for sum-
mary judgment, despite the presence of Mother Hubbard language in the summary judg-
ment order); Anderson v. Long, 52 S.W.3d 385, 385-86 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no
pet.) (determining that an order granting summary judgment was interlocutory, despite
inclusion of Mother Hubbard language, where the motion for summary judgment did not
address the plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and negligence against the defendants
and where nothing in the order suggested that the trial court intended to dispose of those
claims. "The Mother Hubbard clause, by itself, does not make the judgment final."). The
Waco Court of Appeals in Henderson observed that, if it were to render the judgment that
the trial court should have rendered, it would be rendering an interlocutory partial sum-
mary judgment which would become law of the case on remand and not subject to being
set aside or contravened by the trial court. 39 S.W.3d at 395. The court concluded that, in
addition to not having jurisdiction to review a partial summary judgment, taking it upon
itself to review less than the entire case at that time would be imprudent because it would
"affect the trial court's ability to deal with issues as they [might] develop prior to final
judgment." Id.
170. 56 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
171. Id. at 87.
172. Id. at 86.
173. Id. (emphasis added).
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from a recitation on a form. 174
The second case from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals is noteworthy
in its strict application of Lehmann. In Youngblood & Associates,
P.L.L.C. v. Duhon,175 the court concluded that Mother Hubbard lan-
guage in a summary judgment order did not reflect the disposition (de-
nial) of a claim for attorney's fees that was asserted in the motion for
summary judgment. 176 In that case, the plaintiff law firm sued for breach
of contract and on sworn account for payment of legal services rendered,
as well as for attorney's fees incurred in bringing suit. The plaintiff
moved for summary judgment on all of its claims (breach of contract,
sworn account and attorney's fees). 177 The trial court granted the plain-
tiff summary judgment for the debt but the order contained no ruling on
attorney's fees. Instead, the order contained a Mother Hubbard
clause. 178 Relying on Lehmann, the court of appeals concluded that the
Mother Hubbard clause did not constitute a denial of plaintiff's claim for
attorney's fees but, rather, was no longer determinative of finality. 179 Be-
cause the summary judgment order expressly disposed of the plaintiff's
claims for breach of contract and sworn account, the court of appeals
read the order as containing "no ruling" on plaintiff's claim for recovery
of attorney's fees. 180 The court further supported this conclusion by not-
ing that the plaintiff had filed a motion to modify the judgment to include
a ruling on its claim for fees and that the trial court had denied this mo-
tion. According to the court of appeals, the motion to modify "alerted
the trial court to the outstanding claim" and the denial indicated that the
trial court did not intend to rule on all claims and, thus, "did not intend
the summary judgment order to be final, despite the language in the or-
der to the contrary.' 18 1
B. FINALITY IN THE CONVENTIONAL TRIAL CONTEXT
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed in John
v. Marshall Health Services, Inc. 182 that, after a conventional trial on the
merits, a judgment containing a Mother Hubbard clause is presumed fi-
nal. 183 While the court noted that this presumption "should not be rigidly
applied to make judgments final contrary to litigants' reasonable expecta-
tions," the court concluded that the presumption was appropriate where
174. Id. at 87 n.2.
175. 57 S.W.3d 63 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
176. Id. at 65.
177. Id. at 64.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Dehon, 57 S.W.3d at 65.
181. Id.
182. 58 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
183. Id. at 740. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 204 ("If there has been a full trial on the
merits either to the bench or before a jury, the [Mother Hubbard] language indicates the
court's intention to finally dispose of the entire matter, assuming that a separate or bifur-
cated trial is not ordered.").
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the plaintiff went forward with trial against the only defendants against
whom he still wished to prosecute his claims and failed to seek an agreed
judgment reflecting a settlement he had pending against another set of
defendants at the time of judgment. 184 The court noted that the finality
of the judgment, "should not depend on one party's testimony that he did
or did not finalize a settlement with parties from whom he sought no
relief at trial."' 185 The court also pointed out that the trial court was
aware of the pending settlement when it entered the judgment containing
the Mother Hubbard clause, and that there was nothing to indicate that




Interlocutory orders entered during the pendency of a case merge into
the last judgment, creating a final, appealable judgment, even if the final
judgment does not specifically reference the prior interlocutory order. 187
For example, an interlocutory order vacating a default judgment entered
after a bench trial on a bill of review remains in effect and merges into a
final judgment entered after a jury trial on the merits, even if the judg-
ment on the merits does not expressly incorporate the prior interlocutory
order setting aside the default judgment. 188
D. SEVERANCE
As a rule, "the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a separate
cause makes it final."'189 The Texas Supreme Court analyzed this rule in
the context of a trial court's order that severed an interlocutory summary
judgment into a separate cause but then expressly stated that the separate
action should "proceed as such to final judgment or other disposition in
this Court [under a new style and cause number]."1 90 The supreme court
concluded that, where the severance order "expressly contemplated that
the severed claims would 'proceed as such to final judgment or other dis-
position in this Court,' [the order] clearly precluded a final judgment in
the severed action until the later judgment was signed."'191
Notably, a Mother Hubbard clause included in an order severing an
interlocutory summary judgment from the original cause does not make
the judgment in the severed cause final. Absent language (like that seen
in Diversified'92) indicating that the judgment in the severed cause is not
184. Marshall Health, 58 S.W.3d at 740.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Jordan v. Jordan, 36 S.W.3d 259, 265-66 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, pet denied).
188. Id.
189. Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C., 63 S.W.3d
795 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
190. Id. (alteration in original).
191. Id.
192. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
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final, the judgment in the severed cause is final because it disposes of all
parties and issues in that cause-not because it contains a Mother Hub-
bard clause. 193 Moreover, the inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause in a
severance order does not make it a final judgment in the original
cause. 194
E. NONSUIT
The San Antonio Court of Appeals in In re Bro Bro Properties, Inc.' 95
reaffirmed the supreme court's holding in In re Bennett' 96 that:
The signing of an order dismissing a case, not the filing of a notice of
nonsuit, is the starting point for determining when a trial court's ple-
nary power expires. Appellate timetables do not run from the date a
nonsuit is filed, but rather from he date the trial court signs an order
of dismissal. 1 97
Accordingly, in In re Bro Bro, a default judgment entered against one
of several defendants was not final for purposes of appeal, despite the
plaintiff having filed notices of nonsuit against the remaining defendants,
where the trial court had not yet signed an order dismissing the case
against the nonsuited defendants.' 98
F. JUDGMENTS NUNC PRO TUNC
A nunc pro tunc order "allows the trial court to correct clerical errors
in the judgment after the court's plenary power has expired."1 99 Judicial
mistakes may not be corrected by a judgment nunc pro tunc signed after
the expiration of the trial court's plenary power, and a judgment attempt-
ing to do so is void.200 "The salient distinction between 'clerical' and 'ju-
dicial' errors lies in the exercise of the judgmental offices of the court. A
clerical error is one which does not result from judicial reasoning or de-
termination. A judicial error occurs in the rendering as opposed to the
entering of a judgment."' 20 Typical clerical changes include: corrections
of the date of judgment, correction of a party's name, and correction of a
numerical error.202
193. Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Adam, 66 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. 2001) (per
curiam).
194. Id. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192.
195. 50 S.W.3d 528 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, orig. proceeding).
196. 960 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1997).
197. In re Bro Bro, 50 S.W.3d at 530 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Bennett, 960
S.W.2d at 38).
198. 50 S.W.2d at 531.
199. In re Ellebracht, 30 S.W.3d 605, 608 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing Nolan v. Bettis, 562 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no
writ) (correction of date of judgment); Carlyle Real Estate Ltd. Partnership-X v. Leibman,
782 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ) (correction of party's
name); Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 230 (Tex. 1986) (correction of numerical
error)).
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Analyzing the nature of the trial court's nunc pro tunc judgment signed
after the expiration of its plenary jurisdiction in In re Ellebracht, the Tex-
arkana Court of Appeals concluded that the act of vacating an order
granting a new trial and reinstating a judgment against a party constitutes
the correction of a judicial, not a clerical, error, which cannot be made
outside of the court's plenary power.203 In reaching this conclusion, the
Texarkana court noted that there was no evidence in the record to show
the court's intention at the time it granted the new trial and, on its face,
the nunc pro tunc judgment removed the plaintiff's right to re-litigate its
claims, which constituted a substantive, not merely clerical, change. 20 4
IV. EXTENDING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
During the Survey period, the supreme court in John v. Marshall
Health Services, Inc.20 5 resolved a conflict among the courts of appeals as
to the deadline for filing a motion under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
306a(5). Under Rule 306a(1), all periods for filing post-judgment mo-
tions run from the date the judgment is signed.20 6 There is an exception
to this rule, set forth in Rule 306a(4): if a party adversely affected by a
judgment does not receive notice 20 7 of the judgment within 20 days of the
date the judgment is signed, the date for filing post-judgment motions
does not begin to run for that party until the date the party receives no-
tice (but in no event do such periods begin more than 90 days from the
date the judgment was signed). 20 8 The procedure for claiming this excep-
tion requires the party adversely affected to file in the trial court a sworn
motion and notice proving the date on which the party or his attorney
received notice.209 The issue in Marshall Health was the deadline for fil-
ing a Rule 306a(5) motion: three courts of appeal (Dallas, El Paso and
Corpus Christi) had held that such a motion must be filed within 30 days
of the date a party or his attorney received notice,210 while two other
appellate courts (Waco and Austin) had concluded that Rule 306a(5)
does not prohibit a motion from being filed at any time within the trial
court's plenary jurisdiction, measured from the date determined under
Rule 306a(4). 211 Resolving the conflict, the supreme court held that Rule
203. In re Ellebracht, 30 S.W.3d at 609.
204. Id. at 608-09.
205. 58 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. 2001).
206. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(1).
207. "Notice" includes receipt of the notice court clerks are required under Rule
306a(3) to give to the parties or their attorneys immediately when a judgment is signed, or
actual notice of the judgment. Marshall Health, 58 S.W.3d at 740; TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(3).
208. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
209. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(5).
210. See Thompson v. Harco Nat'l Ins. Co., 997 S.W.2d 607, 618 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1998, pet. denied); Gonzalez v. Sanchez, 927 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no
writ); Montalvo v. Rio Nat'l Bank, 885 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994,
no writ); Womack-Humphreys Architects, Inc. v. Barrasso, 886 S.W.2d 809, 816 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
211. See Green v. Guidry, 34 S.W.3d 669, 670 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.);
Grondona v. Sutton, 991 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied); Vineyard
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306a "simply imposes no deadline, and none can be added by decision,
other than the deadline of the expiration of the trial court's
jurisdiction." 212
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S PLENARY POWER
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b provides that the trial court will
maintain plenary jurisdiction for 30 days after a motion for new trial is
denied by the trial court in writing or by operation of law.213 In In re
J.H.,2 14 the court's strict application of Rule 329b's writing requirement
brought about a harsh result. In that case, the trial court timely granted a
motion for new trial by oral pronouncement and docket entry, but never
reduced the order to writing.2 15 Believing that a new trial had been
granted, the parties retried the case, and the appellant appealed the sec-
ond judgment.2 16 The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, concluding that the second trial and all proceedings that took
place after the trial court lost plenary jurisdiction were a nullity.217
Therefore, the first judgment was the final judgment, and, because it was
not appealed, there was nothing to review.2t 8
The court commented on the harshness of its ruling, stating: "We note
the obvious inequity caused by the Rules in this termination of parental
rights case .... Even though the record is crystal clear that the judge
granted a new trial, the absence of a written order has deprived [appel-
lant] of a proper jury trial and appellate review. '219 The court concluded
its opinion by requesting supreme court review, stating that "the current
case cries out for a rule change to prevent the recurrence of the inequita-
ble result we are compelled to reach here.1220
In re Bro Bro Properties, Inc., also decided this Survey period, is a de-
fault judgment case in which the defaulting defendant argued on appeal
that a turnover order was premature because the trial court's plenary
power to grant a new trial had not yet expired.221 The court of appeals
agreed, holding that the trial court maintained plenary jurisdiction be-
cause the judgment did not finally dispose of all parties in the lawsuit. 222
Although the plaintiff filed notices non-suiting all defendants except ap-
Bay Dev. Co. v. Vineyard on Lake Travis, 864 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993,
writ denied).
212. Marshall Health, 58 S.W.3d at 741. The Court, accordingly, disapproved the cases
that had reached a contrary result. Id.
213. TEX. R. Civ. P. 296.
214. 39 S.W.3d 688, 690-91 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
215. Id. at 689-90.
216. Id. at 690.
217. Because the trial court's order granting new trial was ineffective, the court's ple-
nary power expired 30 days after the motion for new trial was overruled by operation of
law, or 105 days after the first judgment was signed. Id. at 689-90.
218. Id. at 690.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 691.
221. 50 S.W.3d 528 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, orig. proceeding).
222. Id. at 531.
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pellant just prior to obtaining its no-answer default, the trial court did not
sign a dismissal order.223 As the supreme court has held, "the signing of
an order dismissing a case, not the filing of a notice of nonsuit, is the
starting point for determining when a trial court's plenary power
expires. 224
VI. STANDING TO APPEAL
In Torrington v. Stutzman,225 the Texas Supreme Court held that an
indemnor had standing to appeal a trial court judgment it was obligated
to pay, even though its indemnee chose not to appeal. In this products
liability case, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer (Textron) of a defective
bearing in a helicopter's tail rotor and its successor (Torrington). The
purchase agreement between Textron and Torrington required Tor-
rington to indemnify Textron for products liability claims based upon the
bearing.
The trial court entered judgment against both defendants, but only Tor-
rington appealed. 226 Plaintiffs argued that Torrington had no standing to
appeal the judgment against Textron.2 27 The supreme court rejected that
argument, holding that Torrington had "a clear justiciable interest in ap-
pealing the judgment against Textron" because it was obligated to pay the
judgment and that Torrington "would be injured by any error in the judg-
ment against Textron." 228
In the class action context, a named plaintiff's lack of individual stand-
ing at the time suit is filed deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction
over the plaintiff's individual claims and claims on behalf of the class.229
VII. PERFECTION OF APPEAL
A. PERFECTING APPEALS UNDER PARTICULAR STATUTES
Five years have passed since the appellate rules changed the procedure
for perfecting appeals in Texas to the filing of a notice of appeal. For the
most part, Texas courts have fleshed out the procedures for perfecting
appeals under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a result, this
Survey period produced a number of decisions involving the procedures
for perfecting appeals under particular statutes, including statutes gov-
erning the appeal of temporary commitment orders, protective orders,
223. Id.
224. Id. at 530 (citing In re Bennet, 960 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tex. 1997)). The appellee at-
tempted to distinguish Bennet, because there the notice of nonsuit was filed after the de-
fault judgment was signed; in this case, the notices of nonsuit were filed before default
judgment was obtained. But the court of appeals found this to be a distinction without a
difference.
225. 46 S.W.3d 829, 843-44 (Tex. 2000).
226. Id. at 833.
227. Id. at 843.
228. Id. at 844.
229. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 711 (Tex. 2001).
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administrative orders, and the admittance of a will to probate as a muni-
ment of title.
1. Appealing a Temporary Commitment Order
Texas Health & Safety Code section 574.070(b) governs the appeals of
temporary commitment orders and provides that a "[n]otice of appeal
must be filed not later than the 10th day after the date on which the order
is signed. '230 In In re J.A.,23 1 the Dallas Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal when the appellant filed a notice of appeal twenty days after judg-
ment was signed. Citing the court of appeals' and supreme court's deci-
sions in Johnstone v. State,232 the court held that, while Rule 26.3
(governing requests to file notices of appeal up to 15 days late) applies to
appeals of temporary commitment orders, Rule 26.1 and Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 324 (governing the extension of the appellate timetable
by filing a motion for new trial) do not.233 Therefore, appellant's motion
for new trial did not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.2 34
Moreover, although appellant sought a Rule 26.3 extension, it did not
properly comply with the rule.2 35 Rule 26.3 provides that the appellate
court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal if the appellant files
its notice of appeal in the trial court and a motion for extension of time in
the court of appeals.2 36 Here, the appellant filed a motion for extension
in the wrong court (the trial court).2 37 The court of appeals held that it
did not have authority to rule on the motion and that the trial court's
order purporting to grant the extension was "void and of no effect. '238
Finally, the court held that no motion for extension could be implied
under these circumstances.2 39 In Verburgt v. Dorner,240 the supreme
court had held that a motion for extension of time is necessarily implied
when an appellant acting in good faith perfects the appeal within the fif-
teen-day period in which appellant would be entitled to move for an ex-
tension of time. However, the court in J.A. concluded that Verburgt did
not apply where, as here, the appellant knew the appeal-invoking instru-
ment was late.24 1 The court reasoned, "[a]pplication of the Verburgt
230. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.070(b) (Vernon 2001).
231. 53 S.W.3d 869, 873 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet. h.).
232. 988 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. App.-Houston [Lst Dist.] 1999), rev'd 22 S.W.3d 408 (Tex.
2000)).
233. J.A., 53 S.W.3d at 871.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 871-72.
236. TEX. R. Ari. P. 26.3.
237. To say that the motion was "filed" at all is a stretch. Indeed, the motion contained
in the appellate record was not file-stamped and the record did not contain any other
indication of filing. The court of appeals only assumed that the motion was filed in the trial
court, because the trial court purported to grant an extension. See J.A., 53 S.W.3d at 871.
238. Id. at 872.
239. Id. at 872-73.
240. 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). While Verburgt was decided under the old appel-
late rules, the J.A. court acknowledged that several courts of appeals had applied its rea-
soning under the new rules. See J.A., 53 S.W.3d at 872 (listing cases).
241. J.A., 53 S.W.3d at 873.
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holding to this case would not only nonsensically 'imply' the existence of
a document already in existence, but would operate to correct a con-
scious, overt act by appellant's counsel rather than a mere omission. '2 42
The court concluded that "[w]e will not extend Verburgt so far. '243
2. Appealing a Protective Order
Recent changes to the Family Code do not render all protective orders
interlocutory, and an immediate appeal is available so long as the dura-
tion of the injunctive relief does not depend on any further order of the
court.2 44 Before the Family Code was amended in 2000, the duration of a
protective order was specified in the order. Now, the duration of a pro-
tective order is either specified in the order or fixed by the statute at two
years, with review available after one year.245 In Pena v. Garza, the State
argued that, because the duration of protective orders vary under the
amended statute, they are interlocutory and reviewable only by manda-
mus.2 46 The court of appeals rejected the State's argument, concluding
that the relief granted did not depend on any further order of the court
and, therefore, constituted a permanent injunction that could be
appealed. 247
3. Appealing an Administrative Order
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. In
Fincher v. Board of Adjustment of the City of Hunters Creek Village,248
appellants failed to appeal a building inspector's decision to a local board
before seeking judicial review in the trial court. The trial court dismissed
the case, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because ap-
pellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.2 49 The court of
appeals reversed, holding that failure to comply with statutory require-
ments to bring suit should not be treated as jurisdictional, but as an issue
the parties may raise on the merits.250 However, because appellants
failed to establish their right to go forward with the suit under applicable
statutes and ordinances, the court rendered judgment against them.25 1
4. Appealing a Probate Order
Under Texas Probate Code section 5(g), "[a]ll final orders of any court
exercising original probate jurisdiction shall be appealable to the court of
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Pena v. Garza, 61 S.W.3d 529, 531 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
245. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.025 (Vernon 2001).
246. Pena, 61 S.W.3d at 531.
247. Id.
248. 56 S.W.3d 815, 816-17 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
249. Id. at 815.




appeals. '252 An order admitting a will to probate as a muniment of title
is a final order.253 Therefore, a party's failure to perfect an appeal from
such an order will result in waiver of the appeal.254
B. PERFECTING APPEALS UNDER COURT RULES
Appellate practitioners received an interesting new instruction from
the Waco Court of Appeals on the issue of whether multiple notices of
appeal are required when the appellant seeks review of more than one
interlocutory trial court order.25 5 In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Bowles,
the appellant sought review of "two entirely separate orders": an order
granting a motion to enforce a Rule 11 agreement and an order denying a
motion to terminate an injunction. 256 The appellant filed a single notice
of appeal stating its desire to "appeal from the court orders" and briefed
the issues together.257 The court of appeals, however, docketed the ap-
peals separately with different cause numbers and stated that it would
have preferred the appellant to have filed two separate notices of appeal.
The court wrote:
Although we believe that, as long as the requirements of Rules 25
and 26 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure are met, a single notice
of appeal can be effective to perfect an appeal from more than one
trial court order, the better practice would be to file a separate notice
of appeal for each separate order from which a party desires to
appeal. 258
The remainder of appeal-perfection cases decided this survey period
produced a simple and straightforward application of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 259 For ex-
ample, it is well established that the time periods that normally run from
the date judgment is signed can be extended to the date the party receives
notice of a judgment if the party can demonstrate that it received notice
more than twenty days, but less than ninety days, after the judgment was
signed. 260 Under those rules, however, there are no circumstances under
which the appellate timetable can begin more than ninety days after the
judgment was signed.2 61 Accordingly, it is not surprising that the court in
Lott v. Hidden Valley Airpark Association, Inc. rejected the appellant's
252. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(g) (Vernon 2001).
253. See In re Estate of Kurtz, 54 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
254. Id.
255. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. App.-Waco June 27,
2001, no pet.) [hereinafter Chase I].
256. Id.; see also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 871, 877 (Tex. App.-
Waco July 18, 2001, no pet.) [hereinafter Chase I1.
257. Chase I at 871.
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Ashiru v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 58 S.W.3d 163, 163-64 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (dismissing appeal for nonpayment of the appel-
late filing fee and record and rejecting appellant's motion for a free record as untimely
under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1).
260. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4); TEX. R. App. P. 4.2(a)(1).
261. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4); TEX. R. App. P. 4.2(a)(1).
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argument that the appellate timetable began on the date the trial court
entered the order under Rule 306a(5) establishing that appellant did not
receive notice of the judgment until approximately nine months after the
judgment was signed. 262
Additionally, it is well established that accelerated appeals must be
filed within twenty days of the signing of the judgment and that a motion
for new trial will not extend the time for perfection. 263 Therefore, it was
not surprising that the court in Denton County v. Huther264 rejected ap-
pellant's argument that its "Motion to Reconsider and Renewed Plea to
the Jurisdiction" was a second plea based upon new authority, the denial
of which was independently appealable under the interlocutory appeal
statute. The court concluded that the motion was nothing more than a
typical motion for new trial or motion to reconsider, which did not extend
the appellate timetable for accelerated appeals.2 65 Accordingly, the court
dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.266
C. AFFIDAVITS OF INABILITY TO PAY COST
Although the filing of an affidavit of indigence is no longer necessary
to invoke appellate jurisdiction, 267 it is nevertheless essential to an appeal
because, if a contest to the affidavit is sustained, the appellant must either
pay for the appellate record or suffer dismissal of the appeal. 268 Accord-
ingly, where the appellant's affidavit does not contain the information
required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1, the trial court
should give the appellant an opportunity to amend its affidavit of inability
to pay costs before dismissing the appeal.269
Additionally, an indigent party can challenge the trial court's order sus-
taining a contest to the party's affidavit of indigence and is entitled to
those portions of the record necessary for the court of appeals to review
the order on the contest without paying for those portions of the re-
cord.270 However, the rules do not allow a party to seek to be declared
an indigent in the court of appeals based on a change in circumstances
after the notice of appeal and initial affidavit of indigence were filed.271
262. 49 S.W.3d 604, 605 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).
263. See TEX. R. App. P. 26.1(b), 28.1.
264. 43 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Wells v. Breton Mill Apartments, No. 07-01-0320-CV, 2001 WL 1111504 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo Sept. 21, 2001, no pet. h.) (not released for publication) (holding that,
because an affidavit of indigence is not a prerequisite to perfection, courts can invoke
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 and, for good cause, accept a late-filed affidavit of
indigence).
268. See In re J.W., 52 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Tex. 2001); Brown v. Paris Indus. Foundation,
46 S.W.3d 321, 322-23 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. dism'd).
269. See J.W., 52 S.W.3d at 733.
270. See Brown, 46 S.W.3d at 322-23 (citing In re Arroyo, 988 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex.
1998)).
271. Id. at 323.
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The standard for proving indigence in the trial court is whether a pre-
ponderance of the evidence shows that the party would be unable to pay
costs "if she really wanted to and made a good faith effort to do so."'272
When a trial court sustains a contest the standard of review on appeal is
abuse of discretion.2 73 Using these standards, the court in White v. Bay-
less found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining a
contest where the evidence showed that the appellant failed to pursue
and use assets that could be used to provide funds for paying for the
appellate record.274
Rule 20.1 does not apply to appeals under the Juvenile Justice Code. 275
Instead, an indigence finding can be based on either a hearing or an affi-
davit filed by the child's parent.276 The appropriate forum to establish
that a juvenile is entitled to appeal without payment of costs is the trial
court, but the trial court's determination on the indigence issue must be
contained in the clerk's record or reporter's record.277
VIII. THE RECORD ON APPEAL
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 13.2 and 34.6, which govern the
duties of court recorders, require electronic recordings to be certified and
filed in the appellate court along with exhibits and a certified copy of the
court recorder's logs. 27 8 One case decided this Survey period addressed
whether a tape recording of a child support/paternity hearing before a
Title IV-D Master could be considered as part of the appellate record. 279
In In re B.R.G., the Master's office forwarded to the court of appeals an
uncertified tape recording without designated exhibits and certified logs
required by the rules.280 The court of appeals abated the appeal for a
clarification of the recorder's record.281 During the abatement, the trial
court conducted a hearing and concluded that (1) it was not possible to
obtain a certified recording of the relevant hearing, but a fully audible
and intelligible recording was available; (2) because the Master who pre-
sided over the hearing does not utilize the services of a court reporter or
a court recorder, no certified log of the proceeding was made; and (3) the
exhibits were designated to be included with the record.2 82 Additionally,
the trial court admitted into evidence the affidavit of the Master, which
272. White v. Bayless, 40 S.W.3d 574, 576 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied)
(citing In re Sosa, 980 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. In re L.P., 51 S.W.3d 855, 856 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2001, no pet.) (citing
In re K.C.A., 36 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex. 2000)).
276. Id. (citing K.C.A., 36 S.W.3d at 503).
277. Id.
278. See TEx. R. Aip. P. 13.2, 34.6.
279. See In re B.R.G., 37 S.W.3d 542, 542-46 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.) [here-
inafter B.R.G. I]; In re B.R.G., 48 S.W.3d 812, 815-16 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.)
[hereinafter B.R.G. 11].
280. See B.R.G. 1, 37 S.W.3d at 543-45.
281. Id. at 545-46.
282. See B.R.G. II, 48 S.W.3d at 816.
[Vol. 55
APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
stated that he presided over the hearing and operated the tape recording,
and that he was tendering a true and correct copy of the tape.283
The court of appeals held that the Master was authorized to make an
audiotape recording of the proceedings because the Family Code requires
a court reporter only when associate judges preside over jury trials or
final termination hearings.284 Citing its previous decision in In re L.B.,285
the court concluded that the cassette copy of the original taped proceed-
ings would comprise the reporter's record in the case. 286
In Halsey v. Dallas County, Texas,287 the court concluded that official
court reporters are an integral part of the court and are therefore im-
mune from suit based on the doctrine of derived judicial immunity.2 88
IX. THE BRIEF ON APPEAL
The supreme court in Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson289
struck a petition for review for failure to comply with Texas Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure 53.2(e), which provides that petitions for review must
state the basis of the court's jurisdiction "without argument. '290 The ma-
jority issued no opinion, but in a dissenting opinion, Justice Hecht ex-
plained that the petition's jurisdictional statement contained a five-page
analysis of the nature of the conflicts that petitioner alleged existed be-
tween the court of appeals' decision and six other appellate court deci-
sions.2 91 Justice Hecht criticized the court's action because, in his
opinion, there was no violation of Rule 53.2(e), striking the petition
served no purpose, and the court's enforcement of Rule 53.2(e) was arbi-
trary and inconsistent.2 92
In Clemens v. Allen,293 the court dismissed an appeal for want of prose-
cution because the pro se appellant's brief (1) failed to identify how the
trial court's summary judgment ruling was erroneous, (2) did not refer-
ence a specific page in the 347-page record, (3) did not contest any partic-
ular summary judgment evidence presented by appellee, and (4) failed to
cite any authorities other than general references to Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 166a. Moreover, appellant's response to the appellate clerk's
notice of deficiency (in which the appellant complained that the clerk's
letter did not point to specific deficiencies of the brief) was ineffective,
283. Id.
284. Id. at 816-17 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 201.009, .104(b) (Vernon 2001)).
285. 936 S.W.2d 335, 336 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
286. See B.R.G. 11, 48 S.W.3d at 817.
287. No. 05-00-01518-CV, 2001 WL 576606, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. filed)
(not released for publication).
288. "Derived judicial immunity" attaches when judges delegate their authority or ap-
point others to perform services for the court. Id. at *2 (citing Byrd v. Woodruff, 891
S.W.2d 689, 707 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ dism'd by agr.).
289. 53 S.W.3d 308, 308-09 (Tex. 2000).
290. TEx. R. App. P. 53.2(e).
291. Daimler-Benz, 53 S.W.3d at 308-09.
292. Id. at 308.
293. See 47 S.W.3d 26, 28 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.).
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because it did not meet or correct the lack of compliance with Rule
38.1.294
X. STAY OF APPEAL
In Davis v. Baker,2 95 the court of appeals held that a bankruptcy
court's order modifying an automatic stay to allow a lawsuit to "proceed
to final judgment" did not allow an appeal to the court of appeals. The
court of appeals reasoned that, "[b]ecause an order modifying an auto-
matic stay must be strictly construed, this Court will not presume that the
bankruptcy court intends to hold in abeyance final resolution of Davis's
pending bankruptcy until all state-court appeals have become final. '296
Therefore, the court suspended and removed the case from the active
docket until further order from the bankruptcy court.2 97
XI. WAIVER ON APPEAL
Similar to the previous Survey period, this Survey period produced two
cases in which the appellants waived their arguments on appeal by failing
to complain about each possible ground upon which the appellee could
have prevailed.
The waiver issue first arose in a non-jury case in which no findings of
fact or conclusions of law were requested or filed.2 98 In the absence of
findings and conclusions, the court of appeals was required to imply find-
ings of fact in favor of the appellee "on every issue [appellee] was obli-
gated to establish by a preponderance of evidence as a predicate for the
desired recovery. '2 99 On appeal, the appellant only complained of two
out of four possible bases of recovery. 300 Therefore, the appellant waived
any possible error the trial court may have made in ruling for appellee on
the two unchallenged grounds, and the trial court's liability determination
was affirmed.30 1
The waiver issue arose again in Rogers v. Continental Airlines, Inc., a
summary judgment case. 302 There, the motion for summary judgment ad-
dressed four separate grounds, the trial court's summary judgment did
not specify the grounds upon which summary judgment was granted, and
the appellant challenged only two grounds on appeal. 30 3 The court of
appeals found waiver and affirmed the trial court's judgment.3°4
294. Id.
295. 29 S.W.3d 921, 923-24 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.).
296. Id. at 924.
297. Id.
298. See Secure Comm., Inc. v. Anderson, 31 S.W.3d 428, 430 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000,
no pet. h.).
299. Id. (citing Roever v. Delaney, 584 S.W.2d 1,80, 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1974, no writ).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 431.
302. 41 S.W.3d 196, 198-99 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 199.
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In Waltrip v. Bilbon Corp.,30 5 the court held that the appellants came
close to waiving their insufficiency challenge by taking inconsistent posi-
tions in the trial court. In that case, the jury initially awarded plaintiffs $0
damages. 30 6 Appellee sought further jury instructions based on conflict-
ing jury answers, and appellants moved the trial court to accept the ver-
dict. 30 7 Appellants' request was denied, and the jury reached a second
verdict after receiving additional instructions.308 The second verdict re-
vised the damages award to give $100 for each of the appellants. 30 9 On
appeal, the appellants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port the verdict.310 The court noted that it was "perplexed" by the posi-
tion taken by appellants: "[A]ppellants' counsel moved the trial court to
accept the verdict, but did not want the trial court to enter judgment on
the verdict .... In urging the trial court to accept the verdict based upon
Rule 295, appellants came close to waiving appellate analysis of their in-
sufficient evidence claim." 31'
XII. SPECIAL APPEALS
A. RESTRICTED APPEALS
A restricted appeal is available to a party that did not participate in the
trial. Consistent with the limited purpose of the restricted appeal, the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals dismissed a restricted appeal for want of
jurisdiction where the appellant's counsel participated at the hearing that
led to the family violence protective order at issue on appeal by making
an opening statement, cross-examining a witness, calling a witness, and
presenting closing argument. 31 2
B. LIMITED APPEALS
Rule 34.6(c) permits a party to limit the issues on appeal and reduce
the size of the reporter's record by requesting the court reporter to pre-
pare a partial reporter's record, listing the issues the appellant intends to
appeal, and sending the request to the court reporter, trial court clerk,
and other parties.313 By strictly complying with the requirements of Rule
34.6(c), a presumption arises that the omitted portions of the record are
not relevant to the disposition of the appeal.314 However, where a party
does not strictly comply with the rule's requirement, a presumption arises
that the omitted portions of the record support the judgment the trial
305. 38 S.W.3d 873, 882 n.4 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. denied).
306. Id. at 876.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 876-77.
310. Waltrip, 38 S.W.3d at 881-82.
311. Id. at 882 n.4.
312. See Franklin v. Wilcox, 53 S.W.3d 739, 741 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).
313. See TEX. R. App. P. 34.6(b)(c); Brown v. McGuyer Homebuilders, Inc., 58 S.W.3d
172, 174-75 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
314. See Brown, 58 S.W.3d at 175.
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court rendered. 31 5
In Brown v. McGuyer Homebuilders, Inc.,316 the Houston Fourteenth
District Court of Appeals found that the appellant had failed to comply
with the strict requirements of Rule 34.6(c) by failing to identify the lim-
ited issues on appeal and by failing to copy the trial court clerk or the
other parties with the request for the reporter's record.317 Notably, the
court found appellant's request to the court reporter to file a copy of the
request with the clerk insufficient, noting that "the rules specifically re-
quire the appellant to file the request with the trial court clerk."' 318 The
court concluded that "[ajppellants' failure to comply with the strict re-
quirements of rule 34.6(c) requires this Court to presume the omitted
portions of the record support the trial court's decisions and judg-
ment. '31 9 Applying that presumption, the court rejected all of appellants'
challenges to the trial court's rulings and affirmed the judgment. 320
C. BILL OF REVIEW
When the time to appeal has passed, a party might consider seeking
review of a judgment through a bill of review. Generally, to be entitled
to a bill of review, a party must show (1) a meritorious defense to the
cause of action alleged to support the judgment, (2) that the party was
prevented from making the defense by the fraud, accident, or wrongful
act of his opponent, and (3) that there was no fault or negligence on the
part of the party seeking review. 32 1
A critical question in every case involving a bill of review is whether
the party had other remedies available to it that it did not exercise. A bill
of review is not available where other legal remedies were available to a
party and the party did not pursue them.322 In Thompson v. Hender-
son,323 the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's judgment
granting a bill of review after finding no evidence to support the jury's
finding that the petitioner acted diligently in availing himself of adequate
legal remedies to set aside the default judgment. 324 In reaching its con-
clusion, the court noted that the petitioner delayed in delivering the de-
fault judgment to his counsel and that his counsel failed to file a motion
for new trial within the trial court's plenary power (despite receiving the
default judgment on the last day of the court's plenary jurisdiction) and




318. Id. at 175 n.3.
319. Brown, 58 S.W.3d at 176.
320. Id.
321. See Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406-07 (Tex. 1979).
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plenary under Rule 306a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 325
In a decision by a divided court, the Beaumont Court of Appeals re-
versed its prior ruling in an earlier case and concluded that a party that
learned of a judgment within six months of the judgment, but who did not
file a writ of error, was still entitled to a bill of review. 326 In Jordan v.
Jordan,327 the Jordans challenged a default judgment that was entered
against them, because the clerk failed to either mail the notice of the
default judgment or note the mailing of the notice on the docket, as re-
quired by Rule 239a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.328 The court
concluded that, although the Jordans received actual notice of the judg-
ment within six months of the date judgment was signed, they could not
avail themselves of a writ of error, because the error in the judgment was
not apparent on the face of the record.329 Specifically, the court reasoned
that "because the 'error' here occurred after judgment was rendered, the
clerk's failure to mail the notice (or to note on the docket the mailing of
the notice) of the signing of the default judgment does not constitute er-
ror reversible by writ of error. '330 Accordingly, the court found no fault
in the Jordan's failure to pursue a writ of error proceeding and held that
their only remedy was by bill of review. 331 Justice Burgess filed a dissent-
ing opinion, because he believed that the Jordans had an adequate rem-
edy by writ of error.332
XIII. FRIVOLOUS APPEALS
In the criminal context, an attorney appointed to represent an indigent
defendant can file a so-called "Anders brief" in the court of appeals if
counsel has concluded that his client's criminal appeal is frivolous. This
procedure, set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Anders v.
The State of California,333 recognizes "the need to safeguard both the
criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel and the appointed
counsel's obligation not to bring frivolous claims before a court. '334 An
Anders brief essentially advises the court of appeals that appointed coun-
sel has, after conscientiously reviewing the record, concluded an appeal is
wholly frivolous. The brief, however, must refer to anything in the record
that might arguably support the appeal. 335
325. Id. at 288-91; TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 2002).
326. See Jordan v. Jordan, 36 S.W.3d 259, 264-65 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, pet.
denied).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 264; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 239a (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 2002).
329. Jordan, 36 S.W.3d at 264.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 265.
332. Id. at 266 (Burgess, J., dissenting).
333. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
334. Id. at 744.
335. Id. See Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 137-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (applying
Anders in criminal context); In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. 1998) (extending An-




In a case of first impression, the Tyler Court of Appeals in In re
K.S.M. 336 extended the Anders brief concept to the parental-termination
context, where, like a criminal defendant, an indigent appellant challeng-
ing an order terminating his or her parental rights enjoys a right to coun-
sel on appeal. 337 To alleviate the dilemma facing appointed counsel
representing the indigent client who wants to appeal a meritless ruling
while still complying with counsel's other ethical duties as a member of
the Bar to avoid pursuing frivolous appeals, the Tyler court held that
"when appointed counsel represents an indigent client in a parental ter-
mination appeal and concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues for
appeal, counsel may file an Anders-type brief. ' 338 The Amarillo Court of
Appeals similarly addressed this issue for the first time in In re A. W. T.,339
a case involving an indigent parent appealing an order terminating the
parent-child relationship. Like the Tyler court in K.S.M., the Amarillo
court reached the same conclusion: "we see no reason why the procedure
utilized in Anders v. California and its progeny should not be available to
appointed counsel faced with the prospect of conducting a meritless ap-
peal, irrespective of whether the appeal involves a criminal or civil
matter. "340
During the Survey period, the El Paso Court of Appeals in Faddoul,
Glasheen & Valles, P.C. v. Oaxaca341 discussed the standards for imposing
sanctions under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 45 and 52.11 for the
filing of a frivolous appeal. "Appellate sanctions," the court held, "will
be imposed only if the record clearly shows the appellant has no reasona-
ble expectation of reversal, and the appellant has not pursued the appeal
in good faith. ' 342 In deciding whether to impose sanctions, the court of
appeals "look[s] at the record from the view point of the advocate and
determine[s] whether it had reasonable grounds to believe the judgment
should be reversed. ' 343 The court identified the four factors that tend to
indicate that an appeal is frivolous:
1. the unexplained absence of a statement of facts;
2. the unexplained failure to file a motion for new trial when it is
required to successfully assert factual sufficiency on appeal;
3. a poorly written brief raising no arguable points of error; and
4. the appellant's unexplained failure to appear at oral argument. 344
336. 61 S.W.3d 632 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, no pet.).
337. Id. at 633-34. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013(a) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2002)
(providing that "[i]n a suit in which termination of the parent-child relationship is re-
quested, the court shall appoint an attorney ad litem to represent the interests of: (1) an
indigent parent of the child who responds in opposition to the termination.").
338. K.S.M., 61 S.W.3d at 364.
339. 61 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).
340. Id. at 88.
341. 52 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet).
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Noting that the appellants had written a very thorough brief, which
included a statement of facts, and that counsel for appellants appeared at
oral argument, the court in Faddoul concluded that the appeal was not
frivolous and refused to assess sanctions. 345
XIV. MOOT APPEALS
An appeal becomes moot when there ceases to be a live controversy
between the parties to the appeal. 346 This is so because, "[U]nder article
II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution, courts have no jurisdiction to issue
advisory opinions. '347 Accordingly, when a party appeals a trial court's
ruling ordering presuit discovery in the form of a deposition, the appeal
becomes moot when the appealing party produces a representative for
deposition in compliance with the trial court's discovery order. 348 Any
opinion issued by the court of appeals after the deposition takes place is
advisory, because the discovery order became moot after the deposition
occurred. 349
Two exceptions to the mootness doctrine currently exist: (1) the "capa-
ble of repetition" exception, and (2) the "collateral consequences" excep-
tion. 350 The "capable of repetition" exception is applied "where the
challenged act is of such short duration that the appellant cannot obtain
review before the issue becomes moot. '351  The "collateral conse-
quences" exception is applied when "prejudicial events have occurred
'whose effects continued to stigmatize helpless or hated individuals long
after the unconstitutional judgment had ceased to operate.' ,,352 Under
the "collateral consequences" exception, the effects are not absolved by
mere dismissal of the cause as moot. 353
Relying on the "collateral consequences" exception, the El Paso Court
of Appeals in In re Salgado held that the issue of whether a protective
order entered in a child possession case was void was not moot despite
the expiration of the order, because, if the court of appeals were to deter-
mine that the protective order was void, a question would arise as to
345. Id.
346. Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 833 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. (vacating the court of appeals' judgment and opinion and dismissing the cause
as moot). See also Kemper v. Stonegate Manor Apartments, Ltd., 29 S.W.3d 362, 363 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (where former tenant failed to file supersedes
bond in appeal from forcible detainer proceeding and writ of possession issued, court of
appeals could no longer grant effectual relief and appeal became moot); Faddoul,
Glasheen & Valles, P.C. v. Oaxaca, 52 S.W.3d 209, 212-13 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no
pet.) (where appellants deposited funds in controversy into the registry of the trial court,
there was no longer any danger of appellants violating injunctive portion of trial court's
order, rendering the appealable interlocutory injunctive order moot).
350. In re Salgado, 53 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, orig. proceeding).
351. Id.





whether the child's aunt had standing to maintain her action to obtain
exclusive possession of the child. 354 "Given this serious collateral conse-
quence," the court held, "we find that the issue before us is not moot. '355
XV. PRACTICE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
In McCullough v. Kitzman,356 the court examined its internal proce-
dure for deciding a motion to disqualify or recuse a court of appeals
judge. In that case, the appellants filed motions for disqualification and
recusal after the court of appeals issued an opinion affirming the trial
court's decision. 357 Because the appellate rules do not provide a proce-
dure for disqualification motions, the court determined that it would fol-
low the same procedures as those used for deciding recusal motions. 358
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 16.3(b), each member of the panel consid-
ered the motions and found no reason to disqualify himself.359 Then, the
justices certified the issue to the entire court, which (with the exception of
the challenged judge) decided each motion with respect to each of the
panel members. 360 The majority of the remaining justices found no rea-
son to recuse or disqualify any member of the panel and denied the
motions.361
XVI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Francis, the court of appeals failed to conduct
a proper legal sufficiency and factual sufficiency analysis, giving the su-
preme court an opportunity to restate those well-established standards. 362
When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an
issue on which she has the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on
appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts
in support of the issue. In reviewing a "matter of law" challenge, the
reviewing court must first examine the record for evidence that sup-
ports the finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary. If there
is no evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court will then
examine the entire record to determine if the contrary proposition is
established as a matter of law. The point of error should be sus-
354. Id. at 757-58.
355. In re Salgado, 53 S.W.3d at 758.
356. 50 S.W.3d 87, 88-89 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied).
357. Id. at 87-88. As an initial matter, the court noted that the motions were subject to
being denied as untimely. See TEX. R. Ai . P. 16.3(a) (stating that a motion to recuse must
be filed "promptly after a party has reason to believe that the justice ... should not partici-
pate in deciding the case"). However, because the court had never addressed in a pub-
lished opinion the timeliness of a motion to recuse under Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 16.3, it proceeded with a determination of the merits of the motions. McCul-
lough, 50 S.W.3d at 88.
358. McCullough, 50 S.W.3d at 88.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 89.
362. 46 S.W.3d 237, 241-42 (Tex. 2001).
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tained only if the contrary proposition is conclusively established.363
In this case, the appellee had the burden of proof on the claim at issue.
364
Thus, in considering only the evidence favorable to appellee, the court of
appeals did not conduct a proper "matter of law" review.
365
When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on
an issue on which she has the burden of proof, she must demonstrate
on appeal that the adverse finding is against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence. The court of appeals must consider
and weigh all of the evidence, and can set aside a verdict only if the
evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and
unjust. 3 6
6
In doing so, the court of appeals must "detail the evidence relevant to the
issue" and "state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly outweighs
the evidence in support of the verdict. ' 367 In Dow, the court of appeals
improperly considered only the evidence favorable to appellee's claim
and did not review the evidence supporting the jury verdict.368 Thus, the
supreme court concluded that the court of appeals did not conduct a
proper factual-sufficiency review.369
B. No-EVIDENCE REVIEW AND THE EQUAL INFERENCE RULE
In Lozano v. Lozano,3 70 a divided supreme court was presented with
an opportunity to reevaluate the equal inference rule. The equal infer-
ence rule provides that "a jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact
from meager circumstantial evidence 'which could give rise to any num-
ber of inferences, none more probable than another." 371 The Lozano
case turned on circumstantial evidence relating to whether Mr. Lozano's
family members aided or assisted in taking, retaining, or concealing his
daughter, over whom Mr. Lozano did not have custody.372 After dis-
counting circumstantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict under the
equal inference rule, the court of appeals held that the evidence was not
legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict.373
The supreme court reversed as to some family members and affirmed
as to others, and Justices Phillips, Hecht, and Baker filed separate concur-
ring and dissenting opinions addressing the equal inference rule and its
effect on the evidence in this case. Under Justice Phillips' view, "the
363. Id.
364. Id. at 242.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 242.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. 52 S.W.3d 141 (Tex. 2001).
371. Id. at 148 (citing Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex.
1997)).
372. Id. at 145-47.
373. Id. at 144.
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equal inference rule is but a species of the no evidence rule. '374 As Jus-
tice Phillips explained: "[i]f circumstantial evidence will support more
than one reasonable inference, it is for the jury to decide which is more
reasonable, subject only to review by the trial court and the court of ap-
peals to assure that such evidence is factually sufficient. '375
Justice Hecht, in contrast, would have applied the equal inference rule
more aggressively, stating that the jury's inference must not only be rea-
sonable, it must be probable. 376 If the jury did not draw an inference that
is more probable than other reasonable inferences, then the jury's verdict
or finding must be set aside on no-evidence grounds. 377
Justice Baker, although agreeing with Justice Phillips' statement of the
standard of review, would have viewed the evidence as a whole and
would have concluded that there was some evidence to support the jury's
verdict as to certain family members.378
In Wal-Mart v. Sturges, the supreme court cited the well-established
principle that courts must review the legal sufficiency of the evidence in
light of the jury charge that the district court gave without objection, even
if the charge's statement of the law is incorrect. 379 However, the court
then created a new standard for establishing the tort of interference with
prospective contractual or business relations and concluded that there
was no evidence to support the jury's verdict. 380 In a concurring opinion,
Justice O'Neill criticized the majority for "straying beyond measuring the
evidence against the charge that was given," and for "expound[ing] on
what the law should be." 38'
C. REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON PRIMARY JURISDICTION
ISSUES
In Subaru of America, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc.,382 the su-
preme court resolved an open question regarding the proper standard of
review of a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for dismissal or abate-
ment based on the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The court concluded
that primary jurisdiction questions are questions of law.383 The court rea-
soned that primary jurisdiction inquiries are quasi-jurisdictional in nature,
374. Id. at 148 (Phillips, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
375. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d at 148.
376. Id. at 158-62 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting).
377. Id.
378. Id. at 162 (Baker, J., concurring and dissenting).
379. 52 S.W.3d 711, 715 n.4 (citing City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 71 (Tex.
2000) (stating that when no objection was made to a jury instruction, evidence to support a
finding based on the instruction should be assessed "in light of" the instruction given) and
Larson v. Cook Consultants, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 567, 568 (Tex. 1985) (same)); see also
Lozano, 52 S.W.3d at 145.
380. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d at 726-28.
381. Id. at 729 (O'Neill, J., concurring).
382. 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 779, No. 00-0292, 2001 WL 578337 (Tex, May 31, 2001).
383. Id. at *5 (abrogating State Bar v. McGee, 972 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1998, no writ); Shell Pipeline Corp. v. Coastal States Trading, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 837,
842 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Simmons v. Danco, Inc., 563
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and often require an analysis of statutory construction. 384 Because both
jurisdictional and statutory construction matters are generally questions
of law, primary jurisdiction issues are also questions of law which are re-
viewed de novo, with no deference to the trial court's decision. 385
D. REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL BASED ON AN
INADEQUATE EXPERT MEDICAL REPORT
Section 13.01 of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
requires medical malpractice plaintiffs, within 180 days of filing suit, to
either provide each defendant physician and health-care provider with an
expert report and the expert's curriculum vitae or to nonsuit the
claims.386 The adequacy of expert reports can be challenged, and the trial
court must dismiss the claims against the defendant if "it appears to the
court ... that the report does not represent a good faith effort to comply
with the definition of an expert report. ' 387 In American Transitional Care
Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Palacios, the supreme court held that the trial
court's determination about the adequacy of an expert report is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. 388 The court reasoned that the
plain language of section 13.01 compelled such a conclusion. 389 First, the
statute itself contains deferential language, directing the trial court to sus-
tain a challenge to an expert report if it "appears to the court" that the
plaintiffs did not make a good-faith effort to meet statutory require-
ments.390 Second, the statute states that dismissal under section 13.01(e)
is a sanction, and sanctions are generally reviewed under an abuse-of-
discretion standard.391
The supreme court disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that
the usual standard of review for sanctions did not apply in this case be-
cause section 13.01 was intended to eliminate frivolous claims, not to
sanction litigation misconduct.392 The supreme court held that filing a
frivolous lawsuit can be litigation misconduct subject to a Rule 13 sanc-
tion and stated that "this is exactly the type of conduct for which sanc-
tions are appropriate. '393
E. BURDEN AND REVIEW IN DEFAMATION CASES
The supreme court in Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc.394 clarified that,
S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (all applying an abuse of discre-
tion standard of review to a trial court's primary jurisdiction analysis)).
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01(d) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
387. Id. § 13.01(l).
388. 46 S.W.3d 873 (Tex. 2001).
389. Id. at 877.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 878.
393. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878.
394. 38 S.W.3d 103, 119 (Tex. 2000).
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to prove defamation, a public-figure plaintiff must establish clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice. Additionally, the majority noted
that "courts are divided on the burden that a public-figure plaintiff bears
in proving falsity. ' 395 However, because neither side briefed the issue,
the court stated that, "on this record," it was unwilling to require clear
and convincing evidence of falsity.396 Accordingly, the court assumed
without deciding that the trial court properly instructed the jury to deter-
mine falsity by a preponderance of the evidence, and reviewed the jury's
finding on falsity under the traditional "no evidence" standard of
review. 397
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Hecht argued that fal-
sity should be proven by clear and convincing evidence, stating that the
majority's "lenient standard for measuring evidence of falsity ... is incon-
sistent with the rule that a statement is not defamatory if it is substantially
true., 398
F. BURDEN AND REVIEW IN UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE
CASES
In an age discrimination case decided this Survey period, the supreme
court established that "motivating factor" is the correct standard of cau-
sation for the plaintiff in all unlawful employment practice claims under
the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act.399 The court reached this
conclusion by reference to the plain meaning of Texas Labor Code sec-
tion 21.125, which requires plaintiffs to prove an unlawful employment
practice by showing that discrimination was a "motivating factor" for the
practice.400 The court then overruled the employer's legal sufficiency
challenge, concluding that, under the motivating factor standard, there
was more than a scintilla of evidence that the employer was motivated by
age discrimination when it fired the plaintiff.40'
G. REVIEW IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES
Under section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, clear and convincing
evidence is required to support an order terminating parental rights.40 2
The clear and convincing standard is an intermediate standard, falling be-
tween preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. In
395. Id. at 117 (comparing Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1976) and Fire-
stone v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712, 723 (5th Cir. 1972) (Bell, J., concurring) (both requiring
clear and convincing evidence of falsity) to Rattray v. City of National City, 51 F.3d 793,
801 (9th Cir. 1994) and Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 341 (2d Cir. 1969) (both
requiring proof of falsity based on a preponderance of the evidence)).
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 131 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting).
399. Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex. 2001).
400. Id. at 474, 480.
401. Id. at 481-82.
402. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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In re N.K., 403 the appellant argued that the heightened quantum of proof
at trial requires that the appellate court reviewing a termination order use
a corresponding intermediate appellate standard of review. Citing the su-
preme court's decision in Meadows v. Green,40 4 the Texarkana Court of
Appeals refused to apply an intermediate standard of review, stating that
it would continue to use the traditional appellate review standard in pa-




A. ABATING AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FOR
TRIAL COURT CLARIFICATION
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.5 governs the trial court's pow-
ers during an interlocutory appeal and provides that, while a trial court
retains jurisdiction of the case, it may not enter an order that (1) is incon-
sistent with any appellate court temporary order; or (2) interferes with or
impairs the appellate court's jurisdiction or the effectiveness of any relief
sought.40 6 In American Home Products v. Clark,40 7 the court of appeals
abated an interlocutory appeal to allow the trial court to clarify its order
on venue. On appeal to the supreme court, the petitioner argued that the
abatement of the appeal for clarification impermissibly invited interfer-
ence with the court of appeals' jurisdiction under Rule 29.5 and had the
effect of instructing the trial court how to make its decision nonreview-
able.408 The supreme court rejected that argument, holding that, because
the appellant complained of the appellate court's ruling and not the trial
court's ruling, Rule 44.4(a) (and not Rule 29.5) applied.40 9 Under Rule
44.4(a), an appellate court cannot affirm or reverse a judgment if the trial
court has committed an error that prevents the proper presentation of the
case on appeal. 41 0 If the trial court's erroneous action or inaction can be
corrected, the appellate court must direct the trial court to do so before
disposing of the case on appeal.411
403. 54 S.W.3d 499, 503 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. filed).
404. 524 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. 1975).
405. N.K., 54 S.W.3d at 503. Justice Grant, concurring, expressly urged the Texas Su-
preme Court to reconsider its ruling in Meadows, arguing that "it is inconsistent to require
a jury to decide a case on one standard and then review it on a different standard." Id. at
506 (Grant, J., concurring). Compare Price v. Lewis, 45 S.W.3d 215, 218, 220-21 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (reviewing trial court's ruling under clear and
convincing evidence standard of review where party contesting results of an election must
carry burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that violations of the Election
Code materially affected the outcome of the election).
406. TEX. R. App. P. 29.5.
407. 38 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. 2000).
408. Id. at 96.
409. Id. at 97.




B. WHEN RENDITION IS PROPER
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 60.2(f) gives the supreme court the
authority to vacate the lower court's judgment and remand the case for
further proceedings in light of changes in the law.412 In Wal-Mart v.
Sturges, the supreme court held for the first time that, "to establish liabil-
ity for interference with prospective contractual or business relation, the
plaintiff must prove that it was harmed by the defendant's conduct that
was either independently tortious or unlawful. '413 However, instead of
remanding the case in light of changes in the law, the court determined
that there was no evidence in the case that the defendant's conduct was
independently tortious or unlawful and rendered judgment for the
defendant. 414
C. WHEN REMAND IS PROPER
During this Survey period, Texas courts of appeals have ordered a re-
mand where a party proceeded under a wrong legal theory,415 where a
party failed to segregate attorney's fees,416 and where there was an irrec-
oncilable conflict in the jury's answers.417
D. DISPOSITION OF DAMAGES AWARDS
It is improper for an appellate court to remand a case for a new trial
solely on a damages issue when liability is contested in the trial court.418
Nor is it proper for an appellate court to grant a judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict and to enter a new damages award by sifting through the
evidence and independently calculating a new award when it is unclear
what amounts the jury awarded for the various line items in a damages
award.419
When a jury's damages award is excessive, remittitur is the appropriate
remedy. 420 A trial court's order of remittitur can be challenged on appeal
by arguing that there was factually sufficient evidence to support the
jury's damages award. 421 When such a sufficiency challenge is sustained,
412. TEX. R. App. P. 60.2(f).
413. 52 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Tex. 2001).
414. Id. at 727-29.
415. Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Bederka, 36 S.W.3d 266, 272 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
2001, no pet.) (remanding in the interest of justice under Rule 43.3(b) where plaintiffs'
petition failed to allege a claim for which sovereign immunity is waived under the Texas
Tort Claims Act).
416. Pratt v. Trinity Projects, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, pet.
denied) (citing Texarkana Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Murdock, 946 S.W.2d 836, 841 (Tex. 1997)).
417. Calabrian Chems. Corp. v. Bailey-Buchanan Masonry, Inc., 44 S.W.3d 276, 282-83
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. denied).
418. See Estrada v. Dillon, 44 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex. 2001). A general denial is sufficient
to contest liability and to prevent remand of a damages issue without a retrial on liability.
Id.
419. II Deerfield Ltd. Partnership v. Henry Bldg., Inc., 41 S.W.3d 259, 268-69 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
420. Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 851 (Tex. 2000).
421. Id.; Gray v. Allen, 41 S.W.3d 330, 331-34 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).
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the court of appeals can modify the trial court's judgment to reinstate the
jury's damages award and affirm the trial court's judgment as
modified.4
22
Where the trial court's judgment does not remit an excessive verdict,
the court of appeals can order a remittitur when the evidence supporting
damages is factually insufficient.423 However, because the supreme court
is not empowered to determine factual sufficiency questions, it cannot
overturn an excessive verdict based on factual insufficiency. 424
However, in Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, the petitioner attempted to
side-step the supreme court's prohibition of deciding factual insufficiency
questions by citing World Oil v. Hicks42 5 and arguing that it was entitled
to a new trial because "a jury that gets damages egregiously wrong proba-
bly got liability wrong, too. '426 In World Oil, the court had held that
remittitur is the appropriate remedy except in cases where the verdict "is
so flagrantly excessive that it cannot be accounted for on any other
ground.
'427
The supreme court in Torrington refused to grant a new trial, reasoning
that it had never before relied on World Oil to disturb a verdict and con-
cluding that World Oil's continued vitality was questionable. 428
E. DISPOSITION AFTER SETTLEMENT
In an unpublished decision from the San Antonio Court of Appeals,
the court not only dismissed an appeal pursuant to settlement, it also is-
sued an order withdrawing a previous opinions issued from the court.429
XVIII. APPELLATE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
Courts of appeals generally have discretion to assess costs in subse-
quent court of appeals proceedings, 430 but, because of the peculiar proce-
dural posture of the case in Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance
Fund v. Mandlbauer, the supreme court concluded that the court of ap-
peals' mandate ordering that "all costs of appeal" be assessed against the
Fund was ambiguous. 431 There the case was initially tried and appealed
422. Gray, 41 S.W.3d at 334.
423. Torrington, 46 S.W.3d at 851.
424. Id.
425. 103 S.W.2d 962, 964 (1937). The court further held that "[t]here are cases where a
shockingly excessive verdict, and the record as a whole, leave no room for doubt that the
minds of the jurors were so controlled and dominated by passion and prejudice as made
them incapable of, or entirely unwilling, to consider a case on the merits." Id.
426. Torrington, 46 S.W.3d at 851.
427. World Oil, 103 S.W.2d at 964
428. Torrington, 46 S.W.3d at 851-52.
429. Perry Homes v. Carnes, No. 04-00-00185-CV, 2001 WL 322187 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio, Apr. 4, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication). The parties had filed a
joint motion informing the court that they had settled and asking the court to dismiss the
proceeding and to vacate all previous opinions, orders, and judgments in the case. Id. at
*1.




to the court of appeals and to the supreme court. 432 The supreme court
reversed and remanded to the court of appeals, ordering Mandlebauer to
pay costs. 433 The court of appeals, on remand, reversed the case and or-
dered that "all costs of the appeal shall be assessed against [the
Fund]. ' 434 The supreme court then heard the case for a second time and
concluded that the court of appeals' mandate was ambiguous, because it
could be interpreted to include costs of the first appeal in the court of
appeals (which the supreme court had ordered Mandlbauer to pay). 435
The court of appeals should have limited costs to the appeal on re-
mand.436 In the end, however, the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals judgment and awarded all costs against Mandlbauer for all
appeals. 437
In Moore v. Bank Midwest,438 the court held that interest on appellate
attorney's fees should run from the date of the notice appeal, not the date
of judgment. The court reasoned that interest on appellate attorney's
fees is directly connected to the pursuit of an unsuccessful appeal and
that the appellee cannot collect interest on money before it is owed. 439
432. Id. at 911.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Mandlbauer, 34 S.W.3d at 912.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. 39 S.W.3d 395, 404 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
439. Id. The trial court's judgment in Moore also impermissibly awarded appellate at-
torney's fees without conditioning the award on an unsuccessful appeal. However, the
court of appeals held that the point was moot because it had already concluded that the
trial court's judgment should be affirmed. Id.
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